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CONFIRMING BANK LIABILITY IN
LETTER OF CREDIT TRANSACTIONS:
WHOSE BANK IS IT ANYWAY?
INTRODUCTION
A letter of credit I is an engagement by an issuer, 2 usually a bank, to
pay a specified amount of money upon presentation of documents3
that comply with the terms set forth in the letter. 4 Often in interna-
1. For general definitions of a letter of credit, see Bank of Newport v. First Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 650, 655-56 (8th Cir. Sept. 10,
1982); East Girard Say. Ass'n v. Citizens Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d 598, 601-
02 (5th Cir. 1979); Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 464-65
(2d Cir. 1970); Voest-Alpine Int'l Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 545 F.
Supp. 301, 303-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Bank of Va.,
544 F. Supp. 386, 393-95 (D. Md. 1982); Intraworld Indus. v. Girard Trust Bank,
461 Pa. 343, 356-57, 336 A.2d 316, 323 (1975), B. Clark, The Law of Bank Deposits,
Collections and Credit Cards 8.2 (rev. ed. 1981); State of N.Y. Law Revision
Comm'n, Report of the Law Revision Comm'n to the Legislature Relating to the
Uniform Commercial Code, Legislative Doc. No. 65(A), at 5, 34-35 (1956), reprinted
in State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, Report and Appendices Relating to the
Uniform Commercial Code 15, 44-45 [hereinafter cited as 1956 Report]; J. White &
R. Summers, Handbook of the Law Under the Uniform Commercial Code § 18-2 (2d
ed. 1980).
2. An issuer is defined as "a bank or other person issuing a credit." U.C.C. § 5-
103(1)(c) (1977); H. Harfield, Letters of Credit 9 (1979) [hereinafter cited as H.
Harfield I].
3. A document is "any paper including document of title, security, invoice,
certificate, notice of default and the like." U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(b) (1977). The term
document was intended by the drafters to be construed in an extremely broad
manner. See id. § 5-103 official comment 2; see, e.g., First Am. Nat'l Bank v. Alcorn,
Inc., 361 So. 2d 481, 487 (Miss. 1978) (invoice held to be "documentary draft");
Marfa Nat'l Bank v. Powell, 512 S.W.2d 356, 359 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (bill of sale
held to be a documentary draft). But see Housing Sec., Inc. v. Maine Nat'l Bank, 391
A.2d 311, 318 & n.9 (Me. 1978) (written notice of default not a "documentary
draft").
4. The UCC is silent as to the requisite standard of compliance. Transamerica
Delaval Inc., v. Citibank, N.A., 545 F. Supp. 200, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Far E.
Textile, Ltd. v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 430 F. Supp. 193, 196 (S.D. Ohio
1977); see U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(a) (1977). The traditional view is that documents must
strictly comply with the terms of the letter. Fitst Arlington Nat'l Bank v. Stathis, 90
Ill. App. 3d 802, 814, 413 N.E.2d 1288, 1298 (1980); Kozolchyk, Preface, 24 Ariz. L.
Rev. 235, 235 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Kozolchyk I]; e.g., Marino Indus. Corp. v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 637, 640-42 (2d
Cir. Aug. 11, 1982); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Heritage Bank, N.A., 595 F.2d 171,
173-74 (3d Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Courtaulds N. Am., Inc. v. North Carolina Nat'l
Bank, 528 F.2d 802, 805-06 (4th Cir. 1975); Voest-Alpine Int'l Corp. v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A., 545 F. Supp. 301, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); International
Leather Distribs. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 464 F. Supp. 1197, 1201 & n.9
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tional transactions the services of a second bank, a confirming bank, 5
are utilized. Because the beneficiary 6 may not be familiar with the
issuing bank, he will often require that a bank in his locale 7 confirm
the letter and thereby become "directly obligated on the credit ... as
though it were its issuer." 8 The resulting liability of the confirming
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 607 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1979); AMF Head Sports Wear, Inc.
v. Ray Scott's All-American Sports Club, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 222, 223 (D. Ariz. 1978);
Lustrelon, Inc. v. Prutscher, 178 N.J. Super. 128, 140, 428 A.2d 518, 524 (App. Div.
1981). See generally Harfield, Identity Crises in Letter of Credit Law, 24 Ariz. L.
Rev. 239 (1982) (discussing the rationale for the strict compliance rule and the
independence principle) [hereinafter cited as Harfield II]. Some courts, however,
have begun to require something less than "strict" compliance. See Corporaction de
Mercadeo Agricola v. Mellon Bank Int'l, 608 F.2d 43, 48 n.1 (2d Cir. 1979) (docu-
ment must "strictly comply with the essential requirements of the letter of credit"
(emphasis added)); Banco Espanol de Credito v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 385
F.2d 230, 237 (1st Cir. 1967) (enforceable compliance when the documentary draft
"'conformed in all significant respects"), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1013 (1968); Crocker
Commercial Servs. Inc. v. Countryside Bank, 538 F. Supp. 1360, 1362-63 (N.D. Ill.
1981) ("reasonable" compliance is sufficient). Still a third approach is to apply a
bifurcated standard which depends upon whether the customer or the beneficiary is
suing the issuer. When the customer sues the issuer for wrongful honor, the issuer
need only establish substantial compliance. However, strict compliance is the stan-
dard when the issuer is sued by the beneficiary for wrongful dishonor. See Transa-
merica Deleval, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 545 F. Supp. 200, 203-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1982);
Data Gen. Corp. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 502 F. Supp. 776, 781 & n.5 (D. Conn.
1980); Far E. Textile, Ltd. v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 430 F. Supp. 193, 196-97
(S.D. Ohio 1977); State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, Study of Uniform Commer-
cial Code: Article 5-Documentary Letters of Credit, Legislative Doc. No. 65(F), at
66 (1955), reprinted in 3 State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, Report of the Law
Revision Comm'n for 1955, at 1569, 1634-35 [hereinafter cited as 1955 Report]; J.
White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-6, at 731-32.
5. A confirming bank is defined as "a bank which engages either that it will
itself honor a credit already issued by another bank or that such a credit will be
honored by the issuer or a third bank." U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(f) (1977); see e.g.,
Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 465 (2d Cir. 1970); Voest-
Alpine Int'l Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 545 F. Supp. 301, 303 (S.D.N.Y.
1982); Lustrelon, Inc. v. Prutscher, 178 N.J. Super. 128, 139, 428 A.2d 518, 524
(App. Div. 1981); Comment, Recent Extensions in the Use of Commercial Letters of
Credit, 66 Yale L.J. 902, 903 & n.7 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Recent Extensions];
cf. Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 481 F.2d 1224, 1232 (5th Cir.
1973) (holding that a bank which "confirms" a letter of credit issued by a non-bank
becomes directly obligated on the credit), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974).
6. A beneficiary is "a person who is entitled under [the letter's] terms to draw or
demand payment." U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(d) (1977); see H. Harfield, Bank Credits and
Acceptances 33 (5th ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as H. Harfield III].
7. R. Braucher & R. Riegert, Introduction to Commercial Transactions 367
(1977); H. Harfield III, supra note 6, at 37; see J. White & R. Summers, supra note
1, § 18-1, at 710.
8. U.C.C. § 5-107(2) (1977).
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bank provides an additional measure of security to the beneficiary. 9 As
the following hypothetical illustrates, however, in certain situations
the presence of a confirming bank in a letter transaction places addi-
tional and unnecessary risks on the customer.' 0
On October 10th, PRS, a French corporation, entered into a con-
tract for the purchase of $700,000 worth of goods from GYP, a
California corporation. To facilitate the purchase, the parties agreed
that PRS would procure the issuance of a letter of credit in GYP's
favor in the amount of the purchase price. The contract also specified
that the letter was to be confirmed by GYP's bank," Harley National
Bank of California. On October 15th, PRS negotiated with Henri
Bank of Paris for the issuance of the letter. Henri Bank, in accordance
with its agreement with PRS, then engaged Harley Bank to confirm
the letter.
Three days before the letter was to expire, 12 GYP presented docu-
ments purporting to conform to the terms of the letter. Upon review,
9. J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-i, at 707; 42 Fordham L. Rev.
706, 710-11 (1974); 52 Tex. L. Rev. 578, 579 (1974); 19 Vill. L. Rev. 686, 688 (1974);
see U.C.C. § 5-107 official comment 2 (1977).
10. A customer is defined as "a buyer or other person who causes an issuer to
issue a credit. The term also includes a bank which procures issuance or confirmation
on behalf of that bank's customer." U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(g) (1977). By nature of the
customer-bank relationship, the customer has been found an indispensable party to
an action for injunctive relief against an issuer. Edgewater Constr. Co. v. Percy
Wilson Mortgage & Fin. Corp., 44 Ill. App. 3d 220, 227-28, 357 N.E.2d 1307, 1313-
14 (1976).
11. The confirming bank is usually a correspondent bank of the issuing bank, yet
it can also often be the beneficiary's own bank. Halls, The Uniform Commercial
Code in Minnesota; Article 5-Letters of Credit, 50 Minn. L. Rev. 453, 454 (1966); cf.
Gillette, Holders in Due Course in Documentary Letter of Credit Transactions, 1982
Ann. Rev. of Banking L. 21, 33 (transferee is commonly the beneficiary's own bank).
12. In a letter of credit transaction, time is of the essence. Liberty Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 218 F.2d 831, 840-41 (10th Cir.
1955); G. Jaris Co. v. Banque D'Athenes, 246 Mass. 546, 549, 141 N.E. 576, 577
(1923); see United Technologies Corp. v. Citibank, N.A., 469 F. Supp. 473, 480
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Hyland Hills Metro. Park & Recreational Dist. v. McCoy Enters.,
38 Colo. App. 23, 26, 554 P.2d 708, 710 (1976); Banco Tornquist, S.A. v. American
Bank & Trust Co., 71 Misc. 2d 874, 874-75, 337 N.Y.S.2d 489, 489-90 (Sup. Ct.
1972): H. Harfield I, supra note 2 at 51. Therefore, a documentary demand for
payment must occur, absent express waiver, before the letter of credit expires.
Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Bank of Va., 544 F. Supp. 386, 400-01 (D. Md.
1982); see Flagship Cruises, Ltd. v. New Eng. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 569 F.2d 699,
702-04 (ist Cir. 1978); Chase Manhattan Bank v. Equibank, 550 F.2d 882, 887 (3d
Cir. 1977); Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 481 F.2d 1224, 1237
(5th Cir. 1973), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974); Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Board
of County Comm'rs, 634 P.2d 32, 41-42 (Colo. 1981); Siderius, Inc. v. Wallace Co.,
583 S.W.2d 852, 860 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
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Harley Bank declined to honor the draft because the certificate of
origin, a required document, had not been legalized by the French
Embassy located in New York.' 3 GYP stated that it would return
shortly with the certified stamp. At that time GYP authorized the
bank to apply the proceeds of the letter to an outstanding loan. One
hour later the certificate of origin, purportedly legalized, was again
produced. The legalization stamp bore a New York address. Despite
the impossibility of GYP's having obtained the required stamp in New
York within one hour, Harley Bank honored the draft and applied the
proceeds towards GYP's outstanding balance. Harley Bank then debi-
ted Henri Bank's account for the sum paid to GYP, plus its fee, and
forwarded the documents to Henri Bank. Satisfied that the documents
complied on their face with the terms of the letter, Henri Bank sent
the documents to PRS and obtained reimbursement.' 4 The goods
13. The duty of an issuer is to "examine documents with care so as to ascertain
that on their face they appear to comply with the terms of the credit." U.C.C. § 5-
109(2) (1977); see United States v. Sun Bank, 609 F.2d 832, 833 (5th Cir. 1980) (per
curiam); Instituto Nacional de Comercializacion Agricola (Indeca) v. Continental
Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 530 F. Supp. 279, 282 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Courtaulds N.
Am., Inc. v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 387 F. Supp. 92, 100 (M.D.N.C.), rev'd on
other grounds, 528 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1975); First Arlington Nat'l Bank v. Stathis, 90
Ill. App. 3d 802, 808, 413 N.E.2d 1288, 1293-94 (1980). The only other requirement
is that the bank must exercise good faith in making that determination. See Lustre-
Ion, Inc. v. Prutscher, 178 N.J. Super. 128, 143-45, 428 A.2d 518, 525-27 (App. Div.
1981); U.C.C. §§ 1-201(19), 5-109(1)-(2), 5-114(2)(b) (1977); H. Harfield I, supra
note 2, at 57.
In examining the documents, the bank's function is purely ministerial. Insurance
Co. of N. Am. v. Heritage Bank, N.A., 595 F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir. 1979) (per
curiam); Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Bank of Va., 544 F. Supp. 386, 395 (D.
Md. 1982); Bank of Newport v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1572, 1577 (D.N.D. 1981), aff'd, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 650(8th Cir. Sept. 10, 1982); Harfield, Letters of Credit and Documentary Drafts., 1
U.C.C. L.J. 205, 207 (1969).
It is often said that with respect to letters of credit, banks deal in documents not in
goods. See Bank of Canton, Ltd. v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 509 F. Supp. 1310, 1314
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 636 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1980); United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge
Sporting Goods Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 254, 259, 360 N.E.2d 943, 948, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265,
270 (1976); see also International Chamber of Commerce, Uniform Customs &
Practices for Documentary Credits (UCP) art. 8(a) (Publication No. 290 rev. ed.
1974) (effective Oct. 1, 1975) ("In documentary credit operations all parties con-
cerned deal in documents and not in goods") [hereinafter cited as U.C.P.]. Because a
bank's duty in honoring a letter of credit is ministerial, its risks in the transaction are
reduced, see Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Bank of Va., 544 F. Supp. 386, 395,
397-99 (D. Md. 1982), and its rate of compensation reflects this narrow duty, see
U.C.C. § 5-109 official comment 1 (1977); H. Harfield III, supra note 6, at 58;
Verkuil, Bank Solvency & Guaranty Letters of Credit, 25 Stan. L. Rev. 716, 720
(1973).
14. The issuer's right to reimbursement is conditioned upon its "duly honoring"
the draft. U.C.C. § 5-114(3) (1977); accord U.C.P., supra note 13, art. 8(b); 12
C.F.R. § 7.7016(e) (1981); H. Harfield I, supra note 2, at 49-50.
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never arrived in France, and consequently, PRS suffered a loss of
$700,000.
Non-performance of a sales contract is not an infrequent occur-
rence, and it was for precisely this reason that the letter of credit
device was developed.15 Letters of credit derive their primary utility
from the principle that an issuer's duty to pay the beneficiary is
entirely independent of the other two contracts comprising the letter
of credit transaction.' 6 If the documents presented by the beneficiary
strictly comply with the terms of the letter, the bank may not raise
any defenses that it may have against its customer,17 nor raise any
defenses that the customer has against the beneficiary on the underly-
ing sales contract.' 8 This independence principle assures the seller-
beneficiary that once the goods have been shipped he will be paid.19
15. See East Girard Say. Ass'n v. Citizens Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d 598,
601 (5th Cir. 1979); Pringle-Associated Mortgage Corp. v. Southern Nat'l Bank, 571
F.2d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 1978); Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d
461, 464 (2d Cir. 1970); Bank of Newport v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 32 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1572, 1576 (D.N.D. 1981), aff'd, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 650 (8th Cir. Sept. 10, 1982).
16. Harfield II, supra note 4, at 241-42; see, e.g., KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhat-
tan Bank, N.A., 606 F.2d 10, 15 (2d Cir. 1979); Bossier Bank & Trust Co. v. Union
Planters Nat'l Bank, 550 F.2d 1077, 1081 app. A (6th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)
(adopting memorandum decision of lower court); Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v.
Bank of Va., 544 F. Supp. 386, 395 (D. Md. 1982); Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 634 P.2d 32, 36-37 (Colo. 1981); New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 173 Conn. 492, 498-99, 378 A.2d 562, 566 (1977).
17. E.g., East Girard Say. Ass'n v. Citizens Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d
598, 602 (5th Cir. 1979); Data Gen. Corp. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 502 F. Supp. 776,
788 (D. Conn. 1980); Baker v. National Blvd. Bank, 399 F. Supp. 1021, 1024 (N.D.
Ill. 1975); see Chase Manhattan Bank v. Equibank, 550 F.2d 882, 886 (3d Cir. 1977).
18. East Girard Say. Ass'n v. Citizens Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d 598, 602
(5th Cir. 1979); see, e.g., Pringle-Associated Mortgage Corp. v. Southern Nat'l Bank,
571 F.2d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 1978); Bossier Bank & Trust Co. v. Union Planters Nat'l
Bank, 550 F.2d 1077, 1081 app. A (6th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (adopting memoran-
dum decision of lower court); cf. Housing See., Inc. v. Maine Nat'l Bank, 391 A.2d
311, 320 (Me. 1978) (holding that settlement of underlying contract did not release
the issuer from liability in damages for wrongful dishonor); First Arlington Nat'l
Bank v. Stathis, 90 Ill. App. 3d 802, 808, 413 N.E.2d 1288, 1294 (1980) (holding that
modification of underlying contract does not affect issuer's liability).
19. State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 1, at 35, reprinted in 1956
Report at 45; see East Girard Say. Ass'n v. Citizens Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d
598, 601 (5th Cir. 1979); Pringle-Associated Mortgage Corp. v. Southern Nat'l Bank,
571 F.2d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 1978); Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425
F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1970); Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Bank of Va., 544 F.
Supp. 386, 394 (D. Md. 1982); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hartford Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 173 Conn. 492, 498-99, 378 A.2d 562, 566 (1977); Lustrelon, Inc. v.
Prutscher, 178 N.J. Super, 128, 139, 428 A.2d 518, 523 (App. Div. 1981); Kingdom
of Sweden v. New York Trust Co., 197 Misc. 431, 441-42, 96 N.Y.S. 2d 779, 788
(Sup. Ct. 1949); Harfield II, supra note 4, at 241.
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Once a letter of credit is established20 in his favor, the seller is
protected against the risks of the buyer's insolvency or dishonesty,21
and in the event that a genuine dispute does exist, the seller becomes
the stakeholder in any prospective litigation. 22 The letter similarly
reduces the risks to the buyer of seller insolvency or dishonesty, by
enabling him to purchase goods without having to pay for them in
advance of shipment. 23 Thus, the letter of credit provides the buyer
20. U.C.C. § 5-106(1)(a) (1977) provides that a letter of credit is established as to
the customer "as soon as a letter of credit is sent to him or the letter of credit or an
authorized written advice of its issuance is sent to the beneficiary." Id. As to the
beneficiary, the letter of credit is established when he has received the letter of credit
or is advised of its issuance. Id. § 5-106(1)(b).
The Code provides that "[a] credit may be either revocable or irrevocable." Id. §
5-103(1)(a). In West Va. Hous. Dev. Fund v. Sroka, 415 F. Supp. 1107 (W.D. Pa.
1976), the court asserted that a revocable letter of credit is actually an illusory
contract since it can be modified or revoked by the issuer without the parties'
consent. Id. at 1111; see Data Gen. Corp. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 502 F. Supp. 776,
783 (D. Conn. 1980) (presumption in favor of irrevocability); U.C.C. § 5-106 official
comment 2 (1977) (establishment of a revocable credit has "no legal significance" as
to the beneficiary or the customer). But see Beathard v. Chicago Football Club, Inc.,
419 F. Supp. 1133, 1137-38 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (letter silent as to revocability deemed
revocable); U.C.P., supra note 13, art. l(c) ("In the absence of [any] indication the
credit shall be deemed to be revocable."). If the letter is irrevocable and established
as to either the beneficiary or the customer it cannot be modified without that party's
consent. U.C.C. § 5-106(2) (1977); see Goodwin Bros. Leasing v. Citizens Bank, 587
F.2d 730, 733-34 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that when the letter of credit left the
issuer's control it was established as to the customer, and the bank was powerless to
modify or cancel it even though the beneficiary had not yet received the letter); West
Va. Hous. Dev. Fund v. Sroka, 415 F. Supp. 1107, 1113 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (customer's
attempt to unilaterally cancel irrevocable letter held ineffective). But see Chase
Manhattan Bank v. Equibank, 550 F.2d 882, 886-87 (3d Cir. 1977) (bank allowed to
modify terms of an irrevocable letter). In addition, even if the customer and the
beneficiary agree to modify the terms of the letter, the issuer may not be bound by
that modification. See AMF Head Sports Wear, Inc. v. Ray Scott's All-American
Sports Club, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 222, 224-25 (D. Ariz. 1978).
21. See 1 A. Lowenfeld, International Private Trade § 1.2 (rev. ed. 1977): J.
White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-1, at 706-08; McLaughlin, Standby Letters
of Credit and Penalty Clauses: An Unexpected Synergy, 40 Ohio St. L.J. 1, 5 (1982).
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
22. Weisz & Blackman, Standby Letters of Credit After Iran: Remedies' of the
Account Party, 1982 Ill. L. Rev. 355, 375; see Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Heritage
Bank, N.A., 595 F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (burden of bringing suit is
shifted to the buyer).
23. See Kingdom of Sweden v. New York Trust Co., 197 Misc. 431, 441-42, 96
N.Y.S. 2d 779, 788 (Sup. Ct. 1949); J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-1, at
704-11. It should be noted that in a commercial letter of credit transaction the issuer
is also protected against customer insolvency because it will usually demand a secur-
ity interest in the goods. Therefore, it can always sell the goods should the buyer be
unable to fulfill the duty of reimbursement. See East Girard Say. Ass'n v. Citizens
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d 598, 602 n.1 (5th Cir. 1979): Consolidated
Aluminum Corp. v. Bank of Va., 544 F. Supp. 386, 394 (D. Md. 1982); McLaughlin,
1224 [Vol. 51
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some assurance of the seller's performance before his duty to reim-
burse the issuer arises. 24
Letters of Credit as Preferential Transfers in Bankruptcy, 50 Fordham L. Rev. 1033,
1037 (1982)- Verkuil, supra note 13, at 721; Recent Extensions, supra note 5, at 905
n.12.
24. See Housing Sec., Inc. v. Maine Nat'l Bank, 391 A.2d 311, 319 (Me. 1978);
Kingdom of Sweden v. New York Trust Co., 197 Misc. 431, 441-42, 96 N.Y.S.2d 779,
788 (Sup. Ct. 1949); H. Harfield III, supra note 6, at 56-57; State of N.Y. Law
Revision Comm'n, supra note 1, at 35, reprinted in 1956 Report at 45. The buyer is
assured of performance only to the extent that the documents actually evidence the
nature of the goods shipped. As a necessary result of the independence principle, the
bank must pay upon presentation of complying documents even if the goods do not
conform with the specifications of the underlying contract. East Girard Say. Ass'n v.
Citizens Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d 598, 602 (5th Cir. 1979); Associacion de
Azucareros de Guatemala v. United States Nat'l Bank, 423 F.2d 638, 641 (9th Cir.
1970); Data Gen. Corp. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 502 F. Supp. 776, 780 (D. Conn.
1980); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 777,
780 (S.D. Iowa 1979); Lustrelon, Inc. v. Prutscher, 178 N.J. Super. 128, 140, 428
A.2d 518, 524 (App. Div. 1981); U.C.C. § 5-114(1) (1977); cf. Banco di Roma v.
Fidelity Union Trust Co., 464 F. Supp. 817, 824 (D.N.J. 1979) (even though terms of
underlying contract were complied with, bank not required to honor draft since
documents were non-complying). To guard against this result, the buyer may also
require that a certificate of inspection, certifying the quality of the goods, accom-
pany the documents that must be presented to the bank. See H. Harfield III, supra
note 6, at 67-68.
Moreover, when there is "fraud in the transaction" the bank is permitted, but not
required, to honor the draft. U.C.C. § 5-114(2) (1977); see Bank of Newport v. First
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 650, 655 (8th Cir. Sept.
10, 1982); KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 606 F.2d 10, 16 (2d Cir.
1979); Scarsdale Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 533 F. Supp.
378, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Baker v. National Blvd. Bank, 399 F. Supp. 1021, 1024
(N.D. Ill. 1975). There may be a fine line between "fraud in the transaction" and
mere non-compliance. For example, in the leading pre-Code case of Sztejn v. J.
Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 177 Misc. 719, 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1941), the
seller, who was required under the contract to ship bristles to the buyer, instead sent
"fifty crates with cowhair, other worthless material and rubbish with intent to
simulate genuine merchandise." Id. at 720, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 633. The court, in holding
that the bank was not required to honor the draft distinguished the fraud from "a
mere breach of warranty regarding the quality of the merchandise." Id. at 722, 31
N.Y.S.2d at 634. Another court has drawn the line at the point "in which the
wrongdoing of the beneficiary has so vitiated the entire transaction that the legiti-
mate purposes of the independence of the issuer's obligation would no longer be
served." Intraworld Indus. v. Girard Trust Bank, 461 Pa. 343, 359, 336 A.2d 316,
324-25 (1975).
Courts have reached conflicting conclusions- as to the application of the "fraud in
the transaction" defense. Some courts accept the defense only when there is fraud in
the underlying transaction and no innocent parties are involved. See Banco Espanol
de Credito v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 409 F.2d 711, 712 (1st Cir. 1969); United
Technologies Corp. v. Citibank, N.A., 469 F. Supp. 473, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 254, 259, 360
N.E.2d 943, 948, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265, 270 (1976). Other courts hold that the defense
only applies when fraud is found with respect to the documents presented. See
Bossier Bank & Trust Co. v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 550 F.2d 1077, 1082 app. A
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In the hypothetical, the presence of Harley Bank in the transaction
had the effect, under traditional analysis, of denying PRS the protec-
tion that a letter of credit is designed to provide. Even though the
goods never arrived, PRS was required to reimburse Henri Bank for
honoring the letter. The duties of a bank honoring a draft, as defined
by the Uniform Commercial Code (Code),25 are to examine the docu-
ments with care to determine that they comply on their face with the
terms of the letter and to exercise good faith in making that determi-
nation. 26 The documents as forwarded to Henri Bank did comply on
their face and because the bank could not have been aware of the
"one-hour trip" to New York, it clearly acted in good faith in honoring
the draft.2 7 Accordingly, Henri Bank did not breach its duty to PRS in
honoring the draft, and was therefore entitled to reimbursement. 28
The issue then presented is from whom may PRS seek relief. Clearly
PRS can sue GYP on the underlying contract, 29 but such an action
(6th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (adopting memorandum decision of lower court); West
Va. Hous. Dev. Fund v. Sroka, 415 F. Supp. 1107, 1114 (W.D. Pa. 1976): Shaffer v.
Brooklyn Park Garden Apts., 311 Minn. 452, 463, 250 N.W.2d 172, 179 (1977).
Neither approach conflicts with the principle that the bank need not go behind the
documents when making the determination whether to honor the credit, because the
bank is privileged to pay the draft. See U.C.C. § 5-114(2)(b) (1977). As long as the
bank acts in good faith in making that determination it retains its right of reimburse-
ment from the customer. See id.; id. § 5-114 official comment 2. See generally H.
Harfield I, supra note 2, at 81-93 (analyzing the Sztein case and its ramifications).
25. U.C.C. § 5-109 (1977).
26. Id. See supra note 11.
27. Good faith is defined as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction
concerned." U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1977). In some Articles of the Code additional
requirements are added to the definition. See, e.g., id. §§ 2-103(1)(b), 7-404. How-
ever, the § 1-201(19) definition is controlling as to Article 5 transactions. See Lustre-
lon, Inc. v. Prutscher, 178 N.J. Super. 128, 143-44, 482 A.2d 518, 526 (App. Div.
1981); U.C.C. § 1-201(19) official comment (1977). Honesty in fact does not mean
absence of negligence, Funding Consultants, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 187
Conn. 637, 643, 447 A.2d 1163, 1165-66 (1982); Industrial Nat'l Bank v. Leo's Used
Car Exch., Inc., 362 Mass. 797, 801-02, 291 N.E.2d 603, 606 (1973); Community
Bank v. Ell, 278 Or. 417, 427-28, 564 P.2d 685, 691 (1977), and therefore the
reasonable man test is not the standard to be applied when determining good faith,
Corporacion Venezolano de Fomento v. Vintero Sales Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1108,
1119 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Republic of Tex. Say. Ass'n v. First Republic Life Ins. Co.,
417 So. 2d 1251, 1255 (La. Ct. App. 1982); see Lustrelon, Inc. v. Prutscher, 178 N.J.
Super. 128, 143, 428 A.2d 518, 526 (App. Div. 1981).
28. An issuer forfeits its right to reimbursement only when the documents do not
comply on their face or when it has acted in bad faith in honoring the draft. H.
Harfield I, supra note 2, at 57; see Chase Manhattan Bank v. Equibank, 550 F.2d
882, 886 (3d Cir. 1977) (issuing bank's waiver of a term jeopardizes its right of
reimbursement); Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Bank of Va., 544 F. Supp. 386,
389 n.8 (D. Md. 1982) (same).
29. See KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 606 F.2d 10, 15 (2d Cir.
1979) (preliminary injunction vacated because action on the underlying contract
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may involve overcoming many of the risks that the use of the letter of
credit was designed to avoid.30 Harley Bank, as a confirming bank,
has also breached a duty imposed upon it by the Code; 31 it knowingly
accepted forged documents and thereby did not act in good faith in
honoring the draft.32 However, most courts have refused to entertain a
direct action by a customer against a confirming bank, reasoning that
such a bank owes a duty of care only to its customer-the issuing
bank-and not to the ultimate customer.3 3 When the confirming bank
alone has breached a duty of good faith, the issuing bank may right-
fully demand reimbursement if the documents comply on their face.
3 4
If the issuing bank then refuses to bring suit against the confirming
bank, which may also be its correspondent bank, 35 the ultimate cus-
tomer is effectively without a remedy. The confirming bank, there-
fore, under this traditional rule, has been allowed to escape liability.
negates the possibility of irreparable harm when fraudulent letter of credit is hon-
ored), U.C.C. § 5-109 official comment 1 (1977) ("[t]he customer will normally have
direct recourse against the beneficiary if performance fails ...."); cf. J. White & R.
Summers, supra note 1, § 18-6, at 728 ("[T]he beneficiary may still recover from the
customer in an action on the underlying contract . ).
30. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
31. See U.C.C. § 5-107(2) (1977). Section 5-107(2) defines the duties of a con-
firming bank and states that "[a] confirming bank by confirming a credit becomes
directly obligated on the credit to the extent of its confirmation as though it were its
issuer and acquires the rights of an issuer." Id.; see Voest-Alpine Int'l Corp. v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A., 545 F. Supp. 301, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Instituto Nacional
de Comercializacion Agricola (Indeca) v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
530 F. Supp. 279, 282 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Harfield I, supra note 2, at 9-10.
32. See Scarsdale Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 533 F.
Supp. 378, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (because bank had actual knowledge of fraud, it had
acted in bad faith and was barred from drawing on the letter of credit).
33. See Dulien Steel Prods. v. Bankers Trust Co., 189 F. Supp. 922, 929
(S.D.N.Y. 1960), aff'd, 298 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1962); Linden v. National City Bank,
12 A.D.2d 69, 70, 208 N.Y.S.2d 182, 184 (1960); Courteen Seed Co. v. Hong Kong &
Shanghai Banking Corp., 216 A.D. 495, 499, 215 N.Y.S. 525, 529 (1926), aff'd, 245
N.Y. 377, 157 N.E. 272 (1927); cf. Oelbermann v. National City Bank, 79 F.2d 534,
537 (2d Cir. 1935) (negotiating bank not liable to ultimate customer), modified per
curiam, 298 U.S. 638 (1936); Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. National City Bank, 20
F.2d 307, 309 (2d Cir.) (defendant bank, which issued letter of credit for its corres-
pondent bank, not liable to ultimate customer), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 497 (1927);
Instituto Nacional De Comercializacion Agricola (Indeca) v. Continental Ill. Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 530 F. Supp. 279, 282-85 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (under the Code
confirming bank does not owe a duty to ultimate customer, but it might be liable in
tort); M. Golodetz Export Corp. v. Credit Lyonnais, 493 F. Supp. 480, 487 (C.D.
Cal. 1980) (remitting bank not liable to ultimate customer); Samuel Kronman & Co.
v. Public Nat'l Bank, 218 A.D. 624, 631, 218 N.Y.S. 616, 622 (1926) (presenting bank
not liable to the ultimate customer).
34. See supra note 14.
35. See H. Harfield III, supra note 6, at 37; Halls, supra note 11, at 454.
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For transactions similar to the hypothetical, in which the only party
to breach its Code-imposed duty of care is the confirming bank, this
Note proposes that a direct action by the ultimate customer against
that bank be allowed. Part I discusses cases in which intermediary
banks have either facilitated a beneficiary's attempt to defraud the
customer or have perpetrated a fraud of their own, and thus illustrates
a myriad of factual settings in which the problem posed is likely to
occur. Part II examines the traditional reasons advanced for denying a
direct cause of action in these situations. Finally, in light of the clear
need for such a cause of action, Part III assesses the various theoretical
bases that can be found both within the Code and with reference to
other areas of law to impose liability on the confirming bank.
I. A PROBLEM IN PRACTICE
The hypothetical presented is a compilation of facts gleaned from
two recent cases. In Instituto Nacional De Comercializacion Agricola
(Indeca) v. Continental Illinois Bank & Trust Co., 36 a confirming
bank had originally refused to honor a draft because one of the
documents presented was missing a legalized certificate of origin. 37 A
few hours later the beneficiary returned with a "legalized" docu-
ment. 38 The confirming bank then honored the draft even though the
bank was located in Chicago and the stamp bore a Miami address. 39
In Pubali Bank v. City National Bank,40 an advising bank 4' had a loan
outstanding with the beneficiary. 42 When the standby letter of credit
was issued, the bank accepted an assignment of the proceeds of the
letter and released the beneficiary's collateral securing the loan.43 The
customer, instead of relying on the letter of credit, paid the benefi-
36. 530 F. Supp. 279 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
37. Id. at 280-81.
38. Id. at 280-82.
39. Id.
40. 676 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1982).
41. U.C.C. § 5-107(1) (1977), which defines the duty of advising banks, states
that an advising bank "does not assume any obligation to honor drafts drawn or
demands for payment made under the credit but it does assume obligation for the
accuracy of its own statement." Id. In contrast, the confirming bank is directly liable
on the credit to the beneficiary. See supra notes 5, 8 and accompanying text.
Therefore, advising banks, and other intermediary banks, as mere conveyors of
information for their principals, perform a different function in the letter of credit
transaction than do confirming banks. See Kozolchyk I, supra note 4, at 235.
42. 676 F.2d at 1328.
43. Id. A letter of credit itself is not assignable unless "'the credit is expressly
designated as transferable or assignable." U.C.C. § 5-116(1) (1977); accord Bank of
Newport v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1572,
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ciary directly and advised the issuer that he had done so.44 In addi-
tion, the customer sent proof of payment to both the issuing and
advising banks. 45 The advising bank nevertheless honored the benefi-
ciary's draft and simultaneously applied the proceeds to the outstand-
ing balance on the loan.
46
Both cases illustrate that in either a commercial or standby letter of
credit4 7 situation, an intermediary bank may be provided with the
1578 (D.N.D. 1981), aff'd, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 650 (8th Cir. Sept. 10,
1982); Pastor v. National Republic Bank, 76 Ill. 2d 139, 148, 390 N.E.2d 894, 897
(1979); Shaffer v. Brooklyn Park Garden Apts., 311 Minn. 452, 458-59, 250 N.W.2d
172, 177 (1977); see Watson v. Commissioner, 613 F.2d 594, 598 (5th Cir. 1980).
This rule provides additional protection for the customer in that he retains the right
to prevent someone other than the party he has contracted with from presenting the
documents. H. Harfield III, supra note 6, at 180-81; Weisz & Blackman, supra note
22, at 366. On the other hand, the proceeds of a letter of credit are assignable even if
the letter is expressly non-assignable. Bank of Newport v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1572, 1578 (D.N.D. 1981), aff'd, 34 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 650 (8th Cir. Sept. 10, 1982); Pastor v. National Republic
Bank, 76 Ill. 2d 139, 148-49, 390 N.E.2d 894, 898 (1979); Shaffer v. Brooklyn Park
Garden Apts., 311 Minn. 452, 458-59, 250 N.W.2d 172, 177 (1977); U.C.C. § 5-
116(2) (1977); U.C.P., supra note 13, art. 47.
44. 676 F.2d at 1328.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. A standby letter of credit is defined as "any letter of credit . . . which
represents an obligation to the beneficiary on the part of the issuer . . . to make
payment on account of any indebtedness undertaken by the account party, or. . . to
make payment on account of any default by the account party in the performance of
an obligation." 12 C.F.R. § 7.1160(a) (1982). Nearly identical definitions have been
stated by the Federal Reserve Board, id. § 208.8(d), and by the FDIC, id. § 337.2(a).
Although the same rules govern both commercial and standby letters of credit, they
often serve different purposes. Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Bank of Va., 544 F.
Supp. 386, 393 (D. Md. 1982); O'Grady v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 296 N.C. 212,
231, 250 S.E.2d 587, 599 (1978); see Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 634 P.2d 32, 36 (Colo. 1981). The commercial letter of credit is utilized as
a mechanism of payment in sales contracts. E.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v.
Heritage Bank, N.A., 595 F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Consolidated
Aluminum Corp. v. Bank of Va., 544 F. Supp. 386, 393-94 (D. Md. 1982); Housing
See., Inc. v. Maine Nat'l Bank, 391 A.2d 311, 318 (Me. 1978). In contrast, the
standby letter of credit often functions as a means of ensuring performance in
transactions not involving the sale of goods. Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Bank
of Va., 544 F. Supp. 386, 394 (D. Md. 1982); O'Grady v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 296
N.C. 212, 230-31, 250 S.E.2d 587, 599 (1978); McLaughlin, supra note 21, at 6. It
has been adopted for use in a wide variety of financing situations, and as such, is a
more versatile instrument than the commercial letter of credit. Kozolchyk, The
Emerging Law of Standby Letters of Credit and Bank Guarantees, 24 Ariz. L. Rev.
319, 320 (1982) ("Standby credit can encompass virtually every obligation known to
man."); see, e.g., Pringle-Associated Mortgage Corp. v. Southern Nat'l Bank, 571
F.2d 871, 872 (5th Cir. 1978) (security to short-term financers); Chase Manhattan
Bank v. Equibank, 550 F.2d 882, 884 (3d Cir. 1977) (long-term financing); Beathard
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opportunity to take advantage of its traditional insulation from liabil-
ity to the ultimate customer. 48 Because the confirming bank deals
directly with the beneficiary, 49 it is often in a better position than the
issuer or customer to recognize forgery.50 However, because of geo-
graphical proximity, the confirming bank is often closely allied with
the beneficiary, and therefore may fail to fulfill the limited duty of
v. Chicago Football Club, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1133, 1135 (N.D. Il. 1976) (guarantee
of salary payment); First Arlington Nat'l Bank v. Stathis, 90 Ill. App. 3d 802, 804,
413 N.E.2d 1288, 1291 (1980) (collateral for loan). See generally J. White & R.
Summers, supra note 1, § 18-1, at 708-09 (outlining the various uses of letters of
credit); Verkuil, supra note 13, at 721-24 (same); Recent Extensions, supra note 5, at
903-09 (same).
Another distinction is that the issuer of a standby letter of credit expects to pay only
if the customer defaults. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Heritage Bank, N.A., 595
F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Bank of
Va., 544 F. Supp. 386, 394 (D. Md. 1982). In contrast, the issuer of a commercial
letter of credit fully expects to be presented with a demand for payment. Id.
48. See Oelbermann v. National City Bank, 79 F.2d 535, 537 (2d Cir. 1935),
modified per curiam, 298 U.S. 638 (1936); Dulian Steel Prods. v. Bankers Trust Co.,
189 F. Supp. 922, 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), aff'd, 298 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1962); Linden v.
National City Bank, 12 A.D.2d 69, 70, 208 N.Y.S.2d 182, 184 (1960): Courteen Seed
Co. v. Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp., 216 A.D. 495, 499, 215 N.Y.S. 525,
530 (1926), aff'd, 245 N.Y. 377, 157 N.E. 272 (1927); Samuel Kronman & Co. v.
Public Nat'l Bank, 218 A.D. 624, 631, 218 N.Y.S. 616, 622 (1926). But see Pubali
Bank v. City Nat'l Bank, 676 F.2d 1326, 1330 (9th Cir. 1982) (advising bank liable to
ultimate customer); Instituto Nacional de Comercializacion Agricola (Indeca) v.
Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 530 F. Supp. 279, 282 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
(ultimate customer has cause of action against confirming bank). In the leading pre-
Code case of Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 177 Misc. 719, 31 N.Y.S.2d
631 (1941), the intermediary was not insulated from liability. The court declined to
dismiss the complaint against the bank on the grounds that rather than being a holder
in due course, the bank was a "mere agent for collection for the account of the seller
charged with fraud." Id. at 723, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 635.
49. See, e.g., Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 481 F.2d 1224,
1226-27 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974); Voest-Alpine Int'l
Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 545 F. Supp. 301, 302-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1982):
Instituto Nacional de Comercializacion Agricola (Indeca) v. Continental Ill. Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 530 F. Supp. 279, 280 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Kingdom of Sweden v.
New York Trust Co., 197 Misc. 431, 442, 96 N.Y.S.2d 779, 788 (Sup. Ct. 1949): cf.
Gillette, supra note 11, at 33 (transferee bank chooses to deal directly with the
beneficiary).
50. Cf. Gillette, supra note 11, at 38-45. Professor Gillette posits that because
transferee banks, such as advising or paying banks, are in the beneficiary's locale,
they are better able to check the facts represented in the documents and thereby
discourage fraud or forgery. Id. at 44. He suggests that the holder in due course
doctrine should be eliminated because the transferee bank will have an incentive to
detect fraud and forgery if it is forced to bear the loss. Id. at 44-45. He concludes that
elimination of the doctrine will force the transferee banks to go behind the docu-
ments in order to ensure their rights of reimbursement, and thus, the dishonest
beneficiary will be deterred from attempting to defraud the customer. Id. at 38.
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good faith imposed upon every party in a transaction governed by the
Code. 5' Because the confirming bank is not amenable to suit by the
ultimate customer, the customer assumes the risk of the confirming
bank's bad faith.
An analogous situation illustrating the risks that can be imposed
upon the customer arose in the Iranian letter of credit cases. Before
the Shah fell from power, many American companies entered into
service contracts with various branches of the Imperial Government
of Iran.5 2 Often a unique two-tier guaranty/standby letter of credit
scheme was employed to assure the American company's perform-
ance. 53 For example, in Touche Ross & Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Co.,54 an accounting firm agreed to provide a guaranty issued
51. See Pubali Bank v. City Nat'l Bank, 676 F.2d 1326, 1329-30 (9th Cir. 1982)
(advising bank, also assignee of proceeds of letter, knowingly accepted false docu-
ments and presented them for honor); Bank of Newport v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 650, 660-61 (8th Cir. Sept. 10, 1982) (issuer
did not have to honor draft presented by bank to which letter of credit had been
assigned because bank not only knew that terms of letter had not been complied
with, but had also participated in preventing the underlying contract from being
performed); Scarsdale Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 533 F.
Supp. 378, 386-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (assignee bank presented documents for honor
when it knew or should have known of the fraud in the transaction); Instituto
Nacional de Comercializacion Agricola (Indeca) v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 530 F. Supp. 279, 281-82 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (confirming bank knew or
should have known that documents presented for honor were forged); Sztejn v. J.
Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 177 Misc. 719, 723, 31 N.Y.S.2d 631, 635 (1941)
(correspondent bank knew of fraud in the transaction and was therefore "a mere
agent for collection" for the beneficiary).
52. See, e.g., Harris Corp. v. National Iranian Radio & Television, 691 F.2d
1344, 1346 (11 th Cir. 1982) (contract to manufacture and service broadcast transmit-
ters): KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 606 F.2d 10, 12 (2d Cir. 1979)
(contract to provide telephone poles to the Water and Power Authority); Itek Corp.
v. First Nat'l Bank, 511 F. Supp. 1341, 1342 (D. Mass. 1981) (contract to manufac-
ture high-technology optical equipment for Imperial Ministry of War); Werner
Lehara Int'l, Inc. v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 484 F. Supp. 65, 66 (W.D. Mich.
1980) (contract to provide machinery, equipment and consulting services in connec-
tion with government bakery project); American Bell Int'l, Inc. v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 474 F. Supp. 420, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (contract to provide equipment and
consulting services to improve Iran's international communications system).
53. Weisz & Blackman, supra note 22, at 360-61; see, e.g., Harris Corp. v.
National Iranian Radio & Television, 691 F.2d 1344, 1346-49 (11th Cir. 1982);
KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 606 F.2d 10, 12 (2d Cir. 1979); Itek
Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 511 F. Supp. 1341, 1342-43 (D. Mass. 1981); Werner
Lehara Int'l, Inc. v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 484 F. Supp. 65, 67-68 (W.D. Mich.
1980); American Bell Int'l, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 474 F. Supp. 420, 421
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); United Technologies Corp. v. Citibank, N.A., 469 F. Supp. 473,
475 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Stromberg-Carlson Corp. v. Bank Melli Iran, 467 F. Supp.
530, 531-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
54. 107 Misc. 2d 438, 434 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
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by an Iranian bank securing the company's performance to the Ira-
nian Ministry of War.55 This Iranian bank guaranty was in turn
supported by a standby letter of credit issued by an American bank in
favor of the Iranian guarantor bank. 56 The court granted the plain-
tiff's preliminary injunction against honor, 57 stating that because the
Iranian bank had been nationalized, and was owned by Khomeni's
Islamic Republic of Iran, it "could not have legitimately paid on the
guaranty, as [the bank] would be simply paying itself. Therefore, any
call on the letter of credit would be fraudulent." 58 Numerous courts
deciding the Iranian letter of credit cases have similarly recognized
this increased likelihood of a fraudulent call under a letter of credit. 59
55. Id. at 440, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 577.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 443, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 578. The test for granting preliminary injunctions
in the Second Circuit, in which many of the Iranian cases were decided, requires the
plaintiff to show the possibility of irreparable harm and either 1) probability of
success on the merits or 2) serious questions pertaining to the merits of a litigation and
a balance of hardships that tips decidedly toward the party requesting the prelimi-
nary relief. KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 606 F.2d 10, 14 (2d Cir.
1979); Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979) (per
curiam); Caulfield v. Board of Educ., 583 F.2d 605, 610 (2d Cir. 1978).
Harfield contends that injunctions against honor can be properly granted only
when there is "egregious fraud," no adequate remedy at law and no innocent parties
who will be harmed. Harfield, Enjoining Letter of Credit Transactions, 95 Banking
L.J. 596, 614-15 (1978). Moreover, the California legislature has deleted the phrase
"but a court of appropriate jurisdiction may enjoin such honor" in their version of §
5-114(2)(b). See Cal. Com. Code § 5114(2)(b) (West 1964). The rationale for this
deletion is that allowing a customer to enjoin the issuer from honoring the letter
would "erode the certainty [of payment to the beneficiary] that should accompany
letter of credit transactions." Agnew v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 34 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 1304, 1309 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 1982); see Cal. Com. Code §
5114(2)(b) comment 6 (West 1964).
58. 107 Misc. 2d at 442, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 578.
59. See, e.g., Harris Corp. v. National Iranian Radio & Television, 691 F.2d
1344, 1356 (11th Cir. 1982) ("Moreover, [the ultimate beneficiary's] demand was
made in a situation that was subtly suggestive of fraud. Since [the beneficiary] and
[the Iranian guarantor bank] had both become government enterprises, the demand
was in some sense by Iran upon itself and may have been an effort by Iran to harvest
undeserved bounty from [the issuer]."); Itek Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, No. 80-58,
slip. op. at 7 (D. Mass. May 25, 1982) ("Since the Iranian guarantor bank has been
nationalized, it cannot be called an innocent bystander which simply responded to
the papers which were issued."); Collins Sys. Int'l v. Citibank, N.A., No. 82 Civ. 613
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 1982) ("The problem in this case. . . is that so far as the Iranian
bank and the Iranian Navy are concerned, one hand is washing the other. The
Iranian Bank cannot, as an agency of Iran, be innocently complying with a demand
by the Iranian Navy or by Iran."). As acknowledged by both court and commentator
alike, the standby letter of credit is merely a blank check that is, by its nature, heir to
fraudulent abuse. See Watkins-Johnson Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. C79-0121, slip
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In these cases the Iranian banks were not confirming banks. They
were beneficiaries of standby letters of credit as well as intermediary
guarantors for the Iranian government. Although American banks are
not permitted to issue guaranties, 60 letters of credit can perform a
similar function 1 The Iranian bank's guaranty provided the Iranian
government with the additional measure of security that a confirming
bank provides to the beneficiary of a letter of credit; in both cases a
bank, frequently of the recipient's choice, becomes directly obligated
to pay the beneficiary. Moreover, such bank acquires the right of
reimbursement from an issuer of a letter of credit.62 Therefore, while
these cases are not directly on point, they are analogous to the dangers
that a customer may encounter when a confirming bank is involved in
a letter of credit transaction.
op. at 9 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 1979); American Bell Int'l, Inc. v. Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Co., N.Y.L.J., Mar. 29, 1979, at 7, col. 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff'd
mere., 70 A.D.2d 830, 418 N.Y.S.2d 551 (1979); Weisz & Blackman, supra note 22,
at 366 & n.38.
60. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); Kimen v. Atlas Exch. Nat'l Bank,
92 F.2d 615, 617-18 (7th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 650 (1938); Lord, The
No-Guaranty Rule and the Standby Letter of Credit Controversy, 96 Banking L.J.
46, 62 (1979).
61. Weisz & Blackman, supra note 22, at 358; see Harfield, Code Treatment of
Letters of Credit, 48 Cornell L.Q. 92, 93 (1963) ("A letter of credit always serves as a
guaranty. This does not mean that it is a guaranty. A letter of credit is an identical
twin to a guaranty, but the fact that the two things look alike and may be used for
the same purpose and are difficult to distinguish one from the other, does not mean
that ... there are not differences which, however subtle, are of major importance.")
[hereinafter cited as Harfield IV]. Because of their similarities, a frequent source of
litigation concerns whether the instrument is a standby letter of credit or an ultra
vires bank guaranty. Compare Wichita Eagle & Beacon Publishing Co. v. Pacific
Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 185, 1286 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (instrument not a letter
of credit because it required actual existence of customer's default before payment
could be demanded) and Robert Mallery Lumber Corp. v. B. & F. Assocs. Inc., 294
Pa. Super. 503, 509, 440 A.2d 579, 581 (1982) (instrument not called a letter of
credit, nor was there a promise of payment upon presentation of documents, thus it
was a guaranty) with New Jersey Bank v. Palladino, 77 N.J. 33, 39, 389 A.2d 454,
457-58 (1978) (standby letter of credit is an exception to the rule that banks cannot
issue guaranties). The distinction between a standby letter of credit and a bank
guaranty is that a guarantor becomes liable only after there has been an unsuccessful
demand on the obligor for payment; under a letter of credit, however, the issuer is
primarily liable on the credit. E.g., Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank,
481 F.2d 1224, 1236 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974); Consoli-
dated Aluminum Corp. v. Bank of Va., 544 F. Supp. 386, 394 & n.23 (D. Md. 1982);
International Leather Distribs. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 464 F. Supp. 1197, 1201
n.9 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 607 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1979); Dubuque Packing Co. v.
Fitzgibbon, 599 P.2d 440, 441 (Okla. Ct. App. 1979); see H. Harfield I, supra note 2,
at 2, 7.
62. See U.C.C. § 5-107(2) (1977).
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II. FAILURE TO PROVIDE A CAUSE OF ACTION:
THE PRIVITY CONCEPT
The majority of courts adjudicating suits by a customer against a
confirming bank, or the related issue of suits against an intermediary
bank, have denied the existence of the cause of action.63 In pre-Code
cases, the reason advanced to justify this result was that no privity64
exists between a customer and an intermediary bank.65 The customer's
contract with its bank for the issuance of a letter of credit is entirely
separate and distinct from the issuer's contract with the confirming
bank. 66 The confirming bank performs its services at the request of the
issuer and does not rely on the credit of the customer. 67 In addition,
the confirming bank deals exclusively with the issuing bank in honor-
ing the beneficiary's draft, and looks to that bank for reimburse-
ment. 6
8
63. See supra notes 33, 48 and accompanying text.
64. Privity is defined as referring to "those who exchange the promissory words
or those to whom the promissory words are directed." J. Calamari & J. Perillo, The
Law of Contracts § 17-1, at 605 (2d ed. 1977). It is a basic contract principle that,
with the exception of third party beneficiaries, those not in privity cannot sue to
enforce a contract. See id. § 17-1, at 605-06.
65. See Oelbermann v. National City Bank, 79 F.2d 534, 535, 537 (2d Cir.
1935), modified per curiam, 298 U.S. 638 (1936); Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen v.
National City Bank, 20 F.2d 307, 308-09 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 497 (1927);
M. Colodetz Export Corp. v. Credit Lyonnais, 493 F. Supp. 480, 487 (C.D. Cal.
1980); Dulien Steel Prods. v. Bankers Trust Co., 189 F. Supp. 922, 929 (S.D.N.Y.
1960) (dictum), aff'd, 298 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1962); Linden v. National City Bank, 12
A.D.2d 69, 70, 208 N.Y.S.2d 182, 184 (1960) (dictum); Kronman & Co. v. Public
Nat'l Bank, 218 A.D. 624, 631, 218 N.Y.S. 616, 622 (1926); Courteen Seed Co. v.
Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp., 216 A.D. 495, 499, 215 N.Y.S. 525, 530
(1926), aff'd, 245 N.Y. 377, 157 N.E. 272 (1927); cf. Kingdom of Sweden v. New
York Trust Co., 197 Misc. 431, 439-40, 96 N.Y.S.2d 779, 786-87 (Sup. Ct. 1949)
(plaintiff, Kingdom of Sweden, had capacity to maintain action against confirming
bank because issuing bank was under the administration of the Swedish govern-
ment). But see Kozolchyck, Letters of Credit, in 9 International Encyclopedia of
Comparative Law ch. 5, at 47 (finding "no valid impediment" in locating privity
between the customer and the confirming bank) [hereinafter cited as Kozolchyck II).
66. Courteen Seed Co. v. Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp., 216 A.D. 495,
498, 215 N.Y.S. 525, 529, (1926), aff'd, 245 N.Y. 377, 157 N.E. 272 (1927).
67. Instituto Nacional de Comercializacion Agricola (Indeca) v. Continental Ill.
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 530 F. Supp. 279, 283 (N.D. Ill. 1982); see Kunglig
Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. National City Bank, 20 F.2d 307, 309 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
275 U.S. 497 (1927).
68. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. National City Bank, 20 F.2d 307, 309 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 275 U.S. 497 (1927); Instituto Nacional de Comercializacion Agricola
(Indeca) v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 530 F. Supp. 279, 282 (N.D. Ill.
1982); Courteen Seed Co. v. Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp., 245 N.Y. 377,
382, 157 N.E. 272, 274 (1927); Recent Extensions, supra note 5, at 903 & n.7. There
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A strict reading of the Code has yielded the same result. In Instituto
Nacional De Comercializacion Agricola (Indeca) v. Continental Illi-
nois National Bank & Trust Co.,69 the district court determined that
section 5-107(2) of the Code, 70 which describes a confirming bank as a
bank that "becomes directly obligated on the credit to the extent of its
confirmation as though it were its issuer and acquires the rights of an
issuer," 7' provides only that the confirming bank acquires the right of
reimbursement from its customer, the issuing bank.72 The court sup-
ported this determination by reference to section 5-103(1)(g),73 which
expressly includes an issuing bank that has engaged the services of a
confirming bank within its definition of a "customer. ' 74 Thus, the
original issuer becomes a customer of the confirming bank. This con-
struction is consistent with section 5-109, 75 which sets out the bank's
duty of care under the heading "Issuer's Obligation to Its Cus-
tomer." 76 Therefore, the confirming bank owes its duty of care solely
to the original issuer, and the customer "cannot telescope those two
contractual duties into one." 77
While acknowledging the absence of privity, the Indeca court pro-
ceeded to look beyond it in finding a basis for imposing liability. 78 The
court found that the customer had a cause of action against the
confirming bank in tort for either negligence or fraud. 7 Similarly, in
Pubali Bank v. City National Bank,80 the court held that the bank had
occupied two roles in the transaction: first, as an advising bank and
second, as "lender-creditor" of the beneficiary.8 ' The court allowed
the direct action by reasoning that the bank could not "hide behind
the cloak of a neutral advising bank."81 2 While acknowledging that
there was no privity between the customer and the bank, the court
stated that it was holding the bank jointly liable with the beneficiary
because the bank had acted in its own self-interest.8 3 However, it is
is authority, however, that the confirming bank may look to the ultimate customer
for reimbursement. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
69. 530 F. Supp. 279 (N.D. II1. 1982).
70. U.C.C. § 5-107(2) (1977).
71. Id.
72. 530 F. Supp. at 282.
73. Id. at 283; see U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(g) (1977).
74. U.C.C. § 5-103(i)(g) (1977).
75. Id. § 5-109.
76. Id. (emphasis added); see id. § 1-109 (providing that "section captions are
parts of this Act").
77. 530 F. Supp. at 283.
78. See id. at 282, 285.
79. Id. at 285.
80. 676 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1982).
81. Id. at 1329.
82. Id. at 1330.
83. Id. at 1329-30 & n.5.
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not clear whether the court was simply acknowledging the lack of
privity and holding the bank liable for breach of warranty, or
whether it was imposing liability in tort.8 4
Once it is determined that a need exists for imposing liability in
certain circumstances, the simplest approach would be to do away
with the privity requirement. Because the letter of credit is a unique
device, 5 traditional contract requirements are not always applica-
ble. 6 For instance, section 5-105 expressly removes the requirement of
consideration in the contract between the issuer and the customer.8 "
More on point is the fact that the issuer is neither contractually liable
to the beneficiary,88 nor is the beneficiary technically a third party
beneficiary of the issuer's contract with its customer.8 " Instead the
84. See id. at 1329 & n.5.
8 . E.g., H. Harfield III, supra note 6, at 53 ("No theory [of the validity of
letters of credit] satisfies every intellectual requirement."); 1 A. Lowenfeld, supra
note 21, § 5.53, at 103 ("Probably the best explanation is simply to call a letter of
credit a transaction sui generis-a relationship with no perfect analogies but never-
theless a well defined set of rights and obligations." (footnote omitted)); Joseph,
Letters of Credit: The Developing Concepts and Financing Functions, 94 Banking
L.J. 816, 850 (1977) ("The letter of credit evolved as a mercantile specialty, and the
only way to understand all its facets is to recognize that it is an entity unto itself.").
86. Marino Indus. Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 637, 641-42 (2d Cir. Aug. 11, 1982); East Girard Sav. Ass'n v. Citizens
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d 598, 603 (5th Cir. 1979); Data Gen. Corp. v.
Citizens Nat'l Bank, 502 F. Supp. 776, 784 (D. Conn. 1980) (dictum); see Note,
Letters of Credit: A Solution to the Problem of Documentary Compliance, 50 Ford-
ham L. Rev. 848, 854-55 (1982) ("application of contract principles must be selective
and gauged entirely upon the effect such application will have on the letter transac-
tion").
87. U.C.C. § 5-105 (1977) ("No consideration is necessary to establish a credit or
to enlarge or otherwise modify its terms."); see Toyota Indus. Trucks U.S.A. v.
Citizens Nat'l Bank, 611 F.2d 465, 469 (3d Cir. 1979); Bank of N.C., N.A. v. Rock
Island Bank, 570 F.2d 202, 207(7th Cir. 1978); Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile
Nat'l Bank, 481 F.2d 1224, 1239 n.22 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 1139
(1974); Schweibish v. Pontchartrain State Bank, 389 So. 2d 731, 734, 736 n.20 (La.
Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 396 So. 2d 885 (La. 1981).
88. J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-2, at 711. White and Summers
argue that there is no mutual assent between the beneficiary and the issuer. Id.;
accord Joseph, supra note 85, at 850-51; Comment, Letter of Credit: Current Theo-
ries and Usages, 39 La. L. Rev. 581, 588-90 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Current
Theories]; see Kozolchyk II, supra note 65, at 135-36.
89. J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-2, at 714; Current Theories,
supra note 88, at 590. In a third party beneficiary contract, the rights and obligations
of the third party depend upon the validity of the contract between the promisee and
the promisor. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 64, § 17-9, at 628. The promisor
can assert any defense against the third party beneficiary that he could assert against
the promisee. Id. § 17-8, at 623; see Rotermund v. United States Steel Corp., 474
F.2d 1139, 1142 (8th Cir. 1973). In the letter of credit transaction, however, the
issuer must honor demands for payment that comply with the letter regardless of the
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issuer is "statutorily obligated to honor drafts drawn by the benefi-
ciary."'00 Therefore, it can be argued that the confirming bank, as a
principal party in the letter of credit transaction, should also be
deemed to be statutorily obligated to the customer.
In sum, although most courts continue to apply the contract princi-
ple of privity to deny a direct cause of action, 91 when equitable
notions demand a different result, some courts have found the basis
for a cause of action in other areas of the law.9 2 Unfortunately, those
that have imposed liability have done so on an ad hoc basis. Moreover,
these courts have either been unclear as to the theory applied in
imposing liability,9 3 or when they have been clear, their reasoning has
proven analytically defective.9 4 Therefore, in addition to the need for
a direct action, there is a need for the articulation of a clear basis for
imposing liability, thereby providing certainty in recovery when a
duty has in fact been breached.95
validity of its contract with its customer. E.g., East Girard Say. Ass'n v. Citizens
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d 598, 602 (5th Cir. 1979); Chase Manhattan Bank
v. Equibank, 550 F.2d 882, 886 (3d Cir. 1977); Baker v. National Blvd. Bank, 399 F.
Supp. 1021, 1024 (N.D. Il. 1975); J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-2, at
713. Nevertheless, some courts continue to attempt to characterize the letter of credit
as a third party beneficiary contract. See West Va. Hous. Dev. Fund v. Sroka, 415 F.
Supp. 1107, 1109-10 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Savage v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 413
F. Supp. 447, 451 (N.D. Okla. 1976) (quoting Harvey Estes Constr. Co. v. Dry Dock
Savings Bank, 381 F. Supp. 271, 274 (W.D. Okla. 1974)); Courtaulds N. Am., Inc.
v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 387 F. Supp. 92, 98 (M.D.N.C.), rev'd on other
grounds, 528 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1975); cf. Data Gen. Corp. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank,
502 F. Supp. 776, 785 (D. Conn. 1980) (letter of credit analogized to a third party
beneficiary contract).
90. J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-2, at 711; U.C.C. § 5-114 (1977).
91. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text. See Kozolchyk II, supra note
65, at 47. While American courts are unanimous as to denial of a direct cause of
action, foreign court views differ sharply. Id.
92. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. Some courts have allowed the
ultimate customer to sue the confirming bank, seemingly without recognition of the
analytical problems involved. See Lustrelon, Inc. v. Prutscher, 178 N.J. Super. 128,
136, 428 A.2d 518, 522 (App. Div. 1981); United Commodities-Greece v. Fidelity
Int'l Bank, N.Y.L.J., May 28, 1982, at 6, col. 4.
94. See infra notes 172-78 and accompanying text.
95. See KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 606 F.2d 10, 16 (2d Cir.
1979) ("The financial value of the letter of credit promise is predicated upon its
degree of legal certainty.") (quoting B. Kozolchyk, Commercial Letters of Credit in
the Americas § 18.04[1], at 394-95 (1966)); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Heritage
Bank, N.A., 595 F.2d 171, 176 (3d Cir. 1979) (per curiam) ("[E]ssential to the
viability of [the letter of credit] is the certainty that it provides."); East Girard Sav.
Ass'n v. Citizens Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d 598, 603 (5th Cir. 1979). ("If the
letter of credit is to retain its utility as a commercial instrument, the rights and duties
of the issuer, the beneficiary, and the procurer must remain clear.").
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III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
A. Creating a Cause of Action by Analogy
1. General Flexibility of Article 5
That Article 5 does not explicitly provide the ultimate customer
with a remedy against the confirming bank should not by itself bar a
direct action. The Code does not envision all possible problems, nor
was it meant to. 6 The letter of credit is a flexible device and the
drafters of Article 5 were acutely aware of this fact. Section 5-102(3)"r
codifies this notion of flexibility:
This Article deals with some but not all of the rules and concepts of
letters of credit .... The fact that this Article states a rule does not
by itself require, imply or negate application of the same or a
converse rule to a situation not provided for or to a person not
specified by this Article."'
The official comment to this section states that its purpose was to
make "explicit the court's power to apply a particular rule by analogy
to cases not within its terms, or to refrain from doing so." 9
96. See Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 481 F.2d 1224, 1231-32
(5th Cir. 1973), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974); Consolidated Aluminum
Corp. v. Bank of Va., 544 F. Supp. 386, 399-400 (D. Md. 1982) (quoting U.C.C. § 5-
102 official comment 2 (1977)); Data Gen. Corp. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 502 F.
Supp. 776, 783 (D. Conn. 1980); National Sur. Corp. v. Midland Bank & Trust Co.,
408 F. Supp. 684, 689 n.7 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd on other grounds. 551 F.2d 21 (3d
Cir. 1977); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 173 Conn.
492, 500, 378 A.2d 562, 566 (1977); New Jersey Bank v. Palladino, 77 N.J. 33, 41,
389 A.2d 454, 458 (1978); Harfield IV, supra note 61, at 95-97; cf. U.C.C. § 5-102
official comment 2 (1977) (it would be unwise to codify all the possible law of letters
of credit). In fact, the New York Law Revision Commission based its conclusion that
"no ... improvement would result from adoption of the Article, and that in fact its
enactment would lead to technical deterioration of the law in this area," in part on
their determination that the coverage in Article 5 was incomplete. State of N.Y. Law
Revision Comm'n, supra note 4, at 148, reprinted in, 1955 Report at 1716. Moreover,
New York bankers were vehemently opposed to the adoption of Article 5 because it
was felt that the UCP was adequate for international transactions and was thus
sufficient to regulate domestic letters of credit as well. See Penney, New York Revisits
the Code: Some Variations in the New York Enactment of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 62 Colum. L. Rev. 992, 1004-07 (1962). Because he feels that banks will
continue to operate under the UCP, Harfield has concluded that "there is very little
purpose for the student of bank credits to examine the Uniform Commercial Code at
all." Harfield IV, supra note 61, at 96.
97. U.C.C. § 5-102(3) (1977).
98. Id.
99. Id. official comment 2.
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A number of courts, recognizing the intended flexibility of Article
5, have extended its rules by analogy. 100 In AMF Head Sports Wear,
Inc. v. Ray Scotts All-American Sport Club, Inc., 01 the court recog-
nized that even though the Code provides only that an issuer owes a
duty of good faith to its customer, the issuer owes a concomitant
obligation to the beneficiary. 1 02 In Barclays Bank D.C. 0. v. Mercan-
tile National Bank,10 3 the Fifth Circuit bridged a different "gap" in
the Code's treatment of letters of credit. The defendant bank had
"confirmed" a letter of credit issued by a firm of mortgage consult-
ants. 0 4 The bank subsequently refused to honor the letter arguing that
it was not a confirming bank within the meaning of section 5-
103(f),105 which defines a confirming bank as one which confirms a
letter issued by a "bank."'01 6 The court justified the imposition of
liability, despite the wording of the Code, by reasoning that the
drafters could not have intended to allow a bank in the defendent's
position to escape liability. 0 7 The interpretations given to the Code's
provisions by the Barclays and AMF courts provide a theoretical
foundation for extending the issuer-customer duty 108 to the confirming
bank by analogy.
2. Specific Analogy to the UCP
Further support for imposing liability by reading a duty into the
provisions of the Code can be found in the Uniform Customs and
Practices (UCP).*109 Article 7 of the UCP, which defines the duties of
100. See Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 481 F.2d 1224, 1231-32
(5th Cir. 1973), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974); AMF Head Sports Wear, Inc.
v. Ray Scott's All-American Sports Club, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 222, 224 (D. Ariz. 1978);
cf. United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 254, 261, 360
N.E.2d 943, 950, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265, 272 (1976) (applying § 3-307 provision concern-
ing signatures on negotable instruments to Article 5). But see Consolidated Alumi-
num Corp. v. Bank of Va., 544 F. Supp. 386, 400 (D. Md. 1982) (refusing to extend §
3-511(1) concerning the reasonable diligence standard in late presentment of docu-
ments to Article 5).
101. 448 F. Supp. 222 (D. Ariz. 1978).
102. Id. at 224.
103. 481 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974).
104. Id. at 1226-27.
105. U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(f) (1977).
106. 481 F.2d at 1229. Section 5-103(1)( 0 defines a confirming bank as "a bank
which engages either that it will itself honor a credit already issued by another bank
or that such a credit will be honored by the issuer or a third bank." U.C.C. § 5-
103(1)(f) (1977) (emphasis added).
107. 481 F.2d at 1230-32.
108. See U.C.C. § 5-109 (1977).
109. International Chamber of Commerce, Uniform Customs and Practice for
Documentary Credits (Publication No. 290 rev. ed. 1974) (effective Oct. 1, 1975).
Harfield distinguishes the UCP from the UCC by stating:
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banks, is silent as to whom this duty is owed. "0 Other provisions of the
UCP, however, clearly suggest that obligations do run between the
confirming bank and the ultimate customer. Article 12(a) states that
"[b]anks utilising the services of another bank for the purpose of
giving effect to the instructions of the applicant for the credit do so for
the account and at the risk of the latter." "'1 Additionally, Article 12(c)
states that "[t]he applicant for the credit shall be bound by and liable
to indemnify the banks against all obligations and responsibilities. " " 2
The implication of this section is that the confirming bank could
obtain reimbursement from the ultimate customer. '13 It follows, then,
that the customer should have rights as against the confirming bank.
The key to the Barclays decision to reject a literal analysis of Article
5 was its determination that in order to justify the application of a
rule, "that rule must advance the policy which gave birth to the rule
in the first instance.""14 Application of the rule that the confirming
the UCC undertakes to create a skeletal structure on or around which letters
of credit may develop, whereas the UCP endeavors to describe the develop-
ments as they exist from time to time. Thus the difference is comparable to
that between a summary of Gray's Anatomy and a family photo album.
H. Harfield I, supra note 2, at 4. The letter of credit itself will often provide that it is
to be governed by the UCP. J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-3, at 717. In
certain states if the letter of credit states that it is subject to the UCP then Article 5
will not apply. Id. at 719; see, e.g., KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 606
F.2d 10, 15 & n.3 (2d Cir. 1979); Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Bank of Va., 544
F. Supp. 386, 400 (D. Md. 1982); Hohenberg Co. v. Comitex Knitters Ltd., 104
Misc. 2d 232, 233, 428 N.Y.S.2d 156, 157 (Sup. Ct. 1980). Since the provisions of the
UCP and the UCC are generally consistent, the parties can also stipulate that both
will apply. J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-3, at 719. In addition, courts
will tend to look to the UCC or pre-Code law if the UCP is silent on an issue in
question. Id. at 720; see United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp., 41
N.Y.2d 254, 258 n.2, 360 N.E.2d 943, 947 n.2, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265, 269 n.2 (1976).
110. See U.C.P., supra note 13, art. 7. Article 7 states:
Banks must examine all documents with reasonable care to ascertain that
they appear on their face to be in accordance with the terms and conditions
of the credit. Documents which appear on their face to be inconsistent with
one another will be considered as not appearing on their face to be in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the credit.
Id.; Instituto Nacional de Comercializacion Agricola (Indeca) v. Continental Ill.
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 530 F. Supp. 279, 283 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (because Article 7 is
silent as to whom the duty of care is owed, it is to be construed as consistent with this
court's interpretation of the UCC).
111. U.C.P., supra note 13, art. 12(a).
112. Id. art. 12(c).
113. See id.; see also Harfield II, supra note 4, at 243 ("an issuer or confiriner
who has paid against documents ... is entitled to reimbursement from the party at
whose instance the credit was established" (emphasis added)).
114. Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 481 F.2d 1224, 1230 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974); see Consolidated Aluminum Corp.
v. Bank of Va., 544 F. Supp. 386, 400 (D. Md. 1982).
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bank owes no duty to the ultimate customer may in many instances
actually undermine the utility of the letter of credit as a payment
mechanism designed to reduce risk."15
Even though the customer engages the services of the issuer," 6 an
issuer is not properly classifiable as an agent of the customer. In this
situation a bank is not a fiduciary; rather, it is required to "maintain
a . . .strict impartiality induced by the equal but diametrically op-
posed contractual pressures exerted by the beneficiary and by the
account party."" 7 Both the beneficiary and the customer rely on the
issuing bank's neutrality to reduce their risks in the underlying trans-
action. I"8 Similarly, both parties should be able to rely on the neutral-
ity of any intermediary banks involved in the transaction. Realistically
however, in many cases the bank engaged to confirm the letter of
credit has other dealings with the beneficiary. ',9 It may therefore have
an added interest in seeing the letter of credit honored. 20 Returning to
the hypothetical, because Henri Bank had not incurred liability to
PRS, it had no incentive to sue Harley Bank. Under traditional analy-
sis the customer is denied a cause of action against the confirming
bank; Harley Bank has been effectively insulated from liability even
115. See supra notes 15-24 and accompanying text.
116. See, e.g., Bank of Newport v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 34 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 650, 655 (8th Cir. Sept. 10, 1982); Baker v. National Blvd. Bank,
399 F. Supp. 1021, 1024 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Courtaulds N. Am., Inc. v. North Carolina
Nat'l Bank, 387 F. Supp. 92, 98 (M.D.N.C.), rev'd on other grounds, 528 F.2d 802
(4th Cir. 1975); U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(g) (1977).
117. H. Harfield III, supra note 6, at 104; see U.C.C. § 5-117 official comment
(1977); cf. Banco di Roma v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 464 F. Supp. 817, 823
(D.N.J. 1979) (customer's agent was not an agent of the issuing bank and his
approval did not operate as a waiver of the issuing bank's objections). In addition,
because the confirming bank is independently obligated on the letter of credit, it is
not an agent of the issuer. See Kingdom of Sweden v. New York Trust Co., 197 Misc.
431, 445-46, 96 N.Y.S.2d 779, 791 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
118. See Bank of Newport v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 34 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 650, 656 (8th Cir. Sept. 10, 1982) ("The letter of credit would lose
its commercial vitality if, before honoring drafts, the issuing bank were obliged to
look beyond the terms of the letter."); Marino Indus. Corp. v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, N.A., 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 637, 641 (2d Cir. Aug. 11, 1982) ("It
is the complete separation between the underlying commercial transaction and the
letter of credit that gives the letter its utility in financing transactions."): Intraworld
Indus. v. Girard Trust Bank, 461 Pa. 343, 357, 336 A.2d 316, 323 (1975) ("The great
utility of letters of credit flows from the independence of the issuer-bank's engage-
ment from the underlying contract between beneficiary and customer.").
119. Halls, supra note 11, at 454; cf. Gillette, supra note 11, at 33 (transferee is
often beneficiary's bank).
120. See Pubali Bank v. City Nat'l Bank, 676 F.2d 1326, 1329 (9th Cir. 1982)
(bank as lender-creditor had a direct interest in seeing the letter honored). But see
Oelbermann v. National City Bank, 79 F.2d 534, 585 (2d Cir. 1935), modified per
curiayn, 298 U.S. 638 (1936) (fact that proceeds were applied to an outstanding
balance not significant in the absence of a showing of fraud).
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though it had wrongfully honored the credit.121 In this situation a
literal reading of the Code does not encourage honest dealings; 122
rather, it forces the customer to assume the risk of that bank's bad
faith.
3. Specific Analogy to Article 4
Analogy to the section 4-207 123 warranties of collecting banks pro-
vides another basis for imposing liability directly on the confirming
bank. In the case of forgery, under section 4-207(1), 124 the payor of a
check can sue any collecting bank for breach of warranty. 125 Under
section 4-207(2),126 a collecting bank when sued can pass the loss
further upstream to earlier collecting banks, and ultimately to the
depository bank. 27 The rationale behind this progression is that the
loss should be borne by the party who dealt with the forger and was
therefore in the best position to prevent the forgery. 28 While the
121. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
122. Cf. Gillette, supra note 11, at 44-45 (since transferee, as holder in due course,
is insulated from liability, it has no incentive to take advantage of its superior
position to discourage fraud or forgery).
123. U.C.C. § 4-207 (1977).
124. Id. § 4-207(1).
125. See, e.g., Maddox v. First Westroads Bank, 199 Neb. 81, 89, 256 N.W.2d
647, 653 (1977); Clarkson v. Selected Risks Ins. Co., 170 N.J. Super 373, 383-84, 406
A.2d 494, 499 (Super. Ct. 1979); Atlantic Bank v. Israel Discount Bank, Ltd., 108
Misc. 2d 342, 345, 441 N.Y.S.2d 315, 317 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (per curiam); Bank of the
W. v. Wes-Con Dev. Co., 15 Wash. App. 238, 241, 548 P.2d 563, 566 (1976); T.
Quinn, Uniform Commercial Code Commentary and Law Digest 4-207[A][3]
(1978); J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 15-5, at 598.
126. U.C.C. § 4-207(2) (1977).
127. North Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Hammond, 298 N.C. 703, 708, 260 S.E.2d 617,
621 (1979); Bank of the W. v. Wes-Con Dev. Co., 15 Wash. App. 238, 241, 548 P.2d
563, 566 (1976); B. Clark, supra note 1, 6.4[4][a]; T. Quinn, supra note 125, 4-
207[A][2]; J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 15-5, at 601.
128. E.g., Perkins State Bank v. Connolly, 632 F.2d 1306, 1318 (5th Cir. 1980):
First Nat'l Bank v. Trust Co., 510 F. Supp. 651, 655 (N.D. Ca. 1981); Thornton &
Co. v. Gwinnett Bank & Trust Co., 151 Ga. App. 641, 654, 260 S.E.2d 765, 768
(1979); Maddox v. First Westroads Bank, 199 Neb. 81, 89, 256 N.W.2d 647, 653
(1977); Atlantic Bank v. Israel Discount Bank, 108 Misc. 2d 342, 345-46, 441
N.Y.S.2d 315, 317 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (per curiam); Bank of the W. v. Wes-Con Dev.
Co., 15 Wash. App. 238, 241, 548 P.2d 563, 566 (1976); J. White & R. Summers,
supra note 1, § 15-1, at 580; Note, Drawer v. Collecting Bank for Payment of Checks
on Forged Indorsements-Direct Suit under the Uniform Commercial Code, 45
Temp. L.Q. 102, 106 (1971). Another purpose for the warranty is to speed up the
collection process. Perkins State Bank v. Connolly, 632 F.2d 1306, 1318 (5th Cir.
1980); Menthor, S.A. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1259,
1266-67 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 1982); Miller v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 34 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1640, 1643 (Ariz. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 1982); Sun 'n Sand, Inc. v.
United Cal. Bank, 21 Cal. 3d 671, 685, 582 P.2d 920, 930, 148 Cal. Rptr. 329, 339
(1978); cf. Gillette, supra note 11, at 43-44 (transferee bank is in the best position to
discourage fraud or forgery because it can threaten to harm the dishonest beneficia-
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liability of a confirming bank in the case of forged documents is
considerably more narrow, 29 this Article 4 principle is logically appli-
cable to letter of credit transactions. In the hypothetical, for example,
Harley Bank, because of its unique vantage point, was the only bank
in a position to recognize the forgery.130
In terms of its practical effect, allowing a direct action would not
impose a greater standard of care on the confirming bank than al-
ready exists in its dealings with the issuer.' 3' Extending the express
provisions of the Code by analogy would simply fill a gap left by the
drafters, thereby providing the ultimate customer with a remedy
when the confirming bank alone has breached a code-imposed duty in
honoring the beneficiary's draft.
B. Imposition of Tort Liability for Negligent
Misrepresentation
Section 1-103 132 provides that "[u]nless displaced by the particular
provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity . . . shall
supplement its provisions."1 33 In contrast to extending the provisions
of the Code by analogy, which essentially involves applying rules
already set out in the Code to new situations,134 this second form of
gap filler involves applying rules found outside the Code to augment
its provisions. 35 Many courts, for example, have applied general con-
ry's reputation and because it is easier and less expensive for such a bank to conduct
an investigation).
129. Under U.C.C. § 4-207(2)(a), for example, collecting banks warrant that they
have good title to the instrument. Id. § 4-207(2) (a) (1977). The rationale for imposing
liability on the depository bank is that it should have exercised more care in checking
the forged endorsement of the person cashing the check. B. Clark, supra note 1, at
6.414][a], at 6-45. In contrast, the confirming bank has no duty to make an indepen-
dent investigation. See U.C.C. § 5-109 official comment 2 (1977) ("The purpose of
the examination is to determine whether the documents appear regular on their
face."). Additionally, the confirming bank must merely exercise good faith in making
that determination. See id. §§ 5-107(2), 5-109(1) & official comment 1.
130. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
131. By confirming a credit, the confirming bank acquires the rights and duties of
an issuer. U.C.C. § 5-107(2) (1977). The duties assumed are the examination of
documents with care to determine that they comply on their face and the exercise of
good faith in making this determination. Id. § 5-109. Extending the provisions of the
Code by analog' would not alter these duties, but rather would merely extend them
to a different party.
132. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1977).
133. Id.
134. See Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 481 F.2d 1224, 1230-32
(5th Cir. 1973), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974); Consolidated Aluminum
Corp. v. Bank of Va., 544 F. Supp. 386, 400 (D. Md. 1982); AMF Head Sports
Wear, Inc. v. Ray Scott's All-American Sports Club, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 222, 224 (D.
Ariz. 1978).
135. See Girard Bank v. Mount Holly State Bank, 474 F. Supp. 1225, 1239
(D.N.J. 1979) (While -[c]ourts should be hesitant to improvise new remedies outside
the already intricate scheme of [the Code] . . . this new cause of action would not
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tract principles such as waiver,1 36 estoppel,137 mitigation, 38 accord
and satisfaction 1 39 and the rules of interpretation 140 to letter of credit
interfere with that scheme but extend its principles to a situation not specifically
foreseen by the drafters. The Code cannot be read to preclude a common law
action.").
136. See, e.g.. Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile Natl Bank, 481 F.2d 1224,
1236 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974); Bank of Canton, Ltd. v.
Republic Nat'l Bank, 509 F. Supp. 1310, 1317 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 636 F.2d 30 (2d Cir.
1980); International Leather Distribs. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 464 F. Supp.
1197, 1201-02 (S.D.N.Y.), aJJ'd mere., 607 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1979); Northern Trust
Co. v. Oxford Speaker Co., 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1246, 1251 (Ill. App.
Ct. Sept. 22, 1982); Maurice O'Meara Co. v. National Park Bank, 239 N.Y. 386, 397,
146 N.E. 636, 639 (1925).
137. See, e.g., Bank of N.C., N.A. v. Rock Island Bank, 630 F.2d 1243, 1252 (7th
Cir. 1980); U.S. Indus. v. Second New Haven Bank, 462 F. Supp. 662, 666 (D.
Conn. 1978); Schweibish v. Pontheartrain State Bank, 389 So. 2d 731, 737-38 (La.
Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 396 So. 2d 885 (La. 1981). Application of estoppel is
usually conditioned upon proof that the beneficiary could have cured the defect, not
raised by the issuer, within the effective period of the letter. Flagship Cruises, Ltd. v.
New England Merchants Nat'l Bank, 569 F.2d 699, 703-04 (1st Cir. 1978). In
Flagship Cruises, the court held that "confining protestors to their stated reasons is
limited to situations where the statements may have mislead drawers, who could
have remedied defects but relied on the statement . . . to their injury." Id. at 703:
accord Marino Indus. Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 637, 646 (2d Cir. Aug. 11, 1982); Corporacion de Mereadeo Agricola v.
Mellon Bank Int'l, 608 F.2d 43, 48-49 (2d Cir. 1979); Wing On Bank, Ltd. v.
American Nat'l Bank & Trust, 457 F.2d 328, 328-29 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam);
Voest-Alpine Int'l Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 545 F. Supp. 301, 304-05
& n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Siderius, Inc. v. Wallace Co., 583 S.W.2d 852, 862 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1979). If cure is not possible, reliance is, by definition, not detrimental.
Flagship Cruises, Ltd. v. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank, 569 F.2d 699, 703-04
(1st Cir. 1978); Chase Manhattan Bank v. Equibank, 550 F.2d 882, 887 (3d Cir.
1977); Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Board of County Comm'rs, 634 P.2d 32, 41 (Colo.
1981). But see Northern Trust Co. v. Oxford Speaker Co., 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1246, 1250-51 (Ill. App. Ct. Sept. 22, 1982) (refusing to limit applica-
tion of waiver and estoppel principles to circumstances in which the documents could
have been cured before the expiration date of the letter of credit).
138. See Beckman Cotton Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 666 F.2d 181, 184 (5th Cir.
1982) (customer's refund to beneficiary would be recoverable as an attempt to
mitigate damages); Banco di Roma v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 464 F. Supp. 817,
826-27 (D.N.J. 1979) (advising bank could have sold the goods had the issuing bank
turned the documents of title over to it and thereby mitigated its damages). But see
Bank of N.C., N.A. v. Rock Island Bank, 630 F.2d 1243, 1254 (7th Cir. 1980)
(Article 5 does not require that a beneficiary mitigate damages by attempting to
recover from someone other than the issuer); Toyota Indus. Trucks U.S.A. v. Citi-
zens Nat'l Bank, 611 F.2d 465, 473 (3d Cir. 1979) ("even if a duty to mitigate existed,
[the beneficiary] could not be charged with that obligation as it is evident that [the
bank] could itself have mitigated damages").
139. American Empire Ins. Co. v. Hanover Nat'l Bank, 409 F. Supp. 459, 465-66
(M.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 564 (3d Cir. 1977).
140. See, e.g., Marino Indus. Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 34 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 637, 641 (2d Cir. Aug. 11, 1982); United States v. Sun Bank,
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transactions. Likewise, imposition of common-law principles of tort
liability may provide an alternative means to a necessary end. 4 1
Two cases have analyzed the tort of negligent misrepresentation in
the context of a confirming bank's duty to the ultimate customer, and
have reached conflicting conclusions. 42 In Courteen Seed Co. v.
Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp.,'4 3 the issuer sent a telegram
directing the defendant-confirming bank that if the letter of credit
was not drawn down by its expiration date the amount of the credit
was to be reduced and the expiration delayed for an additional nine
days. 144 The confirming bank, which had negligently overlooked the
expiration date, replied that it had already paid the full amount of the
draft. 45 Because the goods arrived prior to the documents, the plain-
tiff-customer did not learn that the terms of the letter had not been
complied with until after he had accepted the goods. 146 In an action
based upon the defendant's negligent misrepresentation concerning
the beneficiary's compliance with the terms of the letter, the court
held that the defendant-confirming bank did not owe a duty of care to
the plaintiff-customer. 147 The court concluded that the bank "ran all
the risk of its negligent act in buying the draft after the expiry
609 F.2d 832, 833 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Bossier Bank & Trust Co. v. Union
Planters Nat'l Bank, 550 F.2d 1077, 1082 app. A (6th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)
(adopting memorandum decision of lower court); Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhat-
tan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir. 1970); Bank of Newport v. First Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1572, 1577 (D.N.D. 1981), ajf'd, 34
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 650 (8th Cir. Sept. 10, 1982); Far E. Textile, Ltd. v.
Cit
, 
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 430 F. Supp. 193, 197 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
141. See Instituto Nacional de Comercializacion Agricola (Indeca) v. Continental
Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 530 F. Supp. 279, 282, 285 (N.D. Ill. 1982); cf. New
Jersey Bank, N.A. v. Bradford Secs. Operations, Inc., 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Cal-
laghan) 1057, 1069 (3d Cir. Sept. 30, 1982) ("Recognizing a remedy in tort furthers
the policy of Article 8: it promotes the negotiability of securities by placing the risk of
loss on the party most able to minimize that risk."); Girard Bank v. Mount Holly
State Bank, 474 F. Supp. 1225, 1239 (D.N.J. 1979) (Article 4 of "the Code cannot be
read to preclude a common law action" in tort by the depository bank against the
drawer of a check.).
142. Compare Instituto Nacional de Comercializacion Agricola (Indeca) v. Conti-
nental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 530 F. Supp. 279, 285 (N.D. Ill. 1982) ("[T]he
confirming bank owes a duty to the ultimate customer as someone who might
foreseeably be harmed.") with Courteen Seed Co. v. Hong Kong & Shanghai Bank-
ing Corp., 245 N.Y. 377, 382, 157 N.E. 272, 274 (1927) (The confirming bank "could
scarcely anticipate" that the ultimate customer would rely on its representation.).
143. 245 N.Y. 377, 157 N.E. 272 (1927).
144. Id. at 380, 157 N.E. at 273.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 382, 157 N.E. at 274.
1983] 1245
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
date," 148 and that "it was justified in assuming that if the information
was inaccurate the draft would not be paid on presentation."1 49 In
contrast, a very different result was reached in Indeca. 15o Based on
facts similar to those given in the hypothetical in the beginning of this
Note,' ,5 the court found that the confirming bank did indeed owe a
duty of care in tort to the ultimate customer as one who would
foreseeably be harmed by the misrepresentation.
5 2
The tort of negligent misrepresentation may be defined as a negli-
gent misstatement of a material fact. 53 The plaintiff must have rea-
sonably relied upon the misstatement, 54 and the defendant need not
have been the sole cause of the harm.' 55 More importantly, in cases
involving invasion of economic interests as a result of representations
that are negligently made, the plaintiff must further prove that the
defendant owed a duty to convey the information accurately. 50 This
requirement is particularly relevant when the parties are not in priv-
ity 57 because words, by their very nature, are so easily transmittable
to so many.5
8
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Instituto Nacional De Comercializacion Agricola (Indeca) v. Continental Ill.
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 530 F. Supp. 279, 285 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
151. Id. at 280-81. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
152. 530 F. Supp. at 285.
153. See W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 108, at 718-20 (4th ed.
1971).
154. See, e.g,, First Nat'l Bank v. Collins, 44 Colo. App. 228, 232, 616 P.2d 154,
156 (1980); Neff v. Bud Lewis Co., 89 N.M. 145, 148, 548 P.2d 107, 110 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 551 P.2d 1368 (N.M. 1976); Stanford v. Owens, 46 N.C. App. 388, 395,
265 S.E.2d 617, 622 (1980); Rempel v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 471 Pa. 404, 408-
09, 370 A.2d 366, 368 (1977); W. Prosser, supra note 153, § 108, at 714-18.
155. W. Prosser, supra note 153, § 108, at 715.
156. See White v. Guarente, 43 N.Y.2d 356, 363, 372 N.E.2d 315, 319, 401
N.Y.S.2d 474, 478 (1977); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 179, 174 N.E.
441, 444 (1931); Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 239, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (1922);
W. Prosser, supra note 153, § 107, at 704; cf. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552
comment a (1977) (limited liability when there is only pecuniary loss).
157. The law is unsettled as to whether a party not in privity can sue for negli-
gence. In the area of negligent misrepresentation, the fear is that the defendant will
be subjected to unlimited liability to an unforseeable class of plaintiffs. North Am.
Co. For Life & Health Ins. v, Berger, 648 F.2d 305, 306 n.2 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1084 (1981). See infra notes 159-66 and accompanying text. The majority
view is that absence of privity is not a barrier to suit. Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615
F.2d 68, 82 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The general rule that applies in the majority of
American jurisdictions at the present time is that the critical factor in the relationship
between the parties is their reasonable expectations, not their formal legal relation-
ship."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1123 (1981); see, e.g., North Am. Co. For Life &
Health Ins. v. Berger, 648 F.2d 305, 307-08 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1084
(1981); Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 644, 649-50, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958); Williams
v. Polgar, 43 Mich. App. 95, 100, 204 N.W.2d 57, 59 (1972), affd, 391 Mich. 6, 215
N.W.2d 149 (1974); White v. Guarente, 43 N.Y.2d 356, 362, 372 N.E.2d 315, 319,
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Mere foreseeability that words might reach another is not enough to
establish a duty. 159 In Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 160 a case involving
an accounting firm's negligent preparation of a balance sheet,161 Jus-
tice Cardozo concluded that in order to impose liability "[s]omething
more must . . . appear than an intention that the promise shall re-
dound to the benefit of the public or to that of a class of indefinite
extension." 12 The narrow holding in Ultramares was founded upon a
fear of imputing liability "in an indeterminate amount for an indeter-
minate time to an indeterminate class." 16 3 The Restatement of Torts
(Second) section 552(2)164 states that liability is limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose
benefit and guidance he intends to supply the information or knows
that the recipient intends to supply it; and (b) through reliance
upon it in a transaction that he intends the information to influence
or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar
transaction. 165
Liability is thus limited to a "fixed, definable and contemplated"1
66
class of plaintiffs who the defendant has special reason to anticipate
will rely on the statement.
The elements of negligent misrepresentation can be neatly applied
to a letter of credit transaction. The confirming bank's liability is
401 N.Y.S.2d 474, 478 (1977); Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 239, 135 N.E. 275,
276 (1922); Davidson & Jones, Inc. v. County of New Hanover, 41 N.C. App. 661,
668-69, 255 S.E.2d 580, 585 (1979). See generally Prosser, Misrepresentation and
Third Persons, 19 Vand. L. Rev. 231, 231-40 (1966) (examining factors that are
relevant in determining whether a party not in privity can sue on the basis of a
misrepresentation).
158. W. Prosser, supra note 153, § 107, at 706-07.
159. Id. § 107, at 707-08.
160. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
161. Id. at 173, 174 N.E. at 442.
162. Id. at 181, 174 N.E. at 445.
163. Id. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
164. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552(2) (1977).
165. Id. For cases applying the Restatement test, see North Am. Co. For Life &
Health Ins. v. Berger, 648 F.2d 305, 308 n.7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1084
(1981); Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 F.2d 68, 83 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1123 (1981); Seedkem, Inc. v. Safranek, 466 F. Supp. 340, 343-44 (D. Neb.
1979); First Nat'l Bank v. Collins, 44 Colo. App. 228, 230, 616 P.2d 154, 155 (1980);
Davidson & Jones, Inc. v. County of New Hanover, 41 N.C. App. 661, 669, 255
S.E.2d 580, 585 (1979); Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1249 (Utah 1980); Wilber v.
Western Props., 22 Wash. App. 458, 463-64, 589 P.2d 1273, 1276-77 (1979).
166. White v. Guarente, 43 N.Y.2d 356, 362, 372 N.E.2d 315, 319, 401 N.Y.S.2d
474, 478 (1977); accord Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100, 1107 (7th Cir.
1974) (plaintiffs must be "members of a limited class whose reliance ... is specifi-
cally foreseen"), rev'd on other grounds, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Seedkem, Inc. v.
Safranek, 466 F. Supp. 340, 343 (D. Neb. 1979) (could "specifically identify" the
plaintiff); Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 93 (D.R.I. 1968) (statement
1983] 1247
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
logically limited to two parties: 167 the issuing bank, with whom it is in
privity of contract, 68 and the customer, who initiated the letter of
credit transaction. 6 9 In addition, because the confirming bank is
often the only bank that interacts with the beneficiary, it alone is
"uniquely situated" to assess the situation fully. 70 Consequently, the
customer is perfectly justified in relying on the representations of the
confirming bank.171
Although the individual elements of negligent misrepresentation
appear to bridge the gap left open by the Code, the wholesale applica-
tion of the principles of this tort may conflict with express provisions
relied upon by "actually foreseen and limited classes of persons"); Williams v. Polgar,
43 Mich. App. 95, 100, 204 N.W.2d 57, 59 (1972) ("[a]bstracts are prepared for a
limited class"), aff'd, 391 Mich. 6, 215 N.W.2d 149 (1974): Glanzer v. Shepard, 233
N.Y. 236, 242, 135 N.E. 275, 277 (1922) (plaintiffs reliance was the "end and aim"
of the transaction).
167. Instituto Nacional de Comercializacion Agricola (Indeca) v. Continental Ill.
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 530 F. Supp. 279, 284 n.9 (N.D. 111. 1982).
168. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
169. See, e.g., Bank of Newport v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 34 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 650, 651 (8th Cir. Sept. 10, 1982); Marino Indus. Corp. v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A., 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 637, 639 (2d Cir. Aug.
11, 1982); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Heritage Bank, N.A., 595 F.2d 171, 172 (3d
Cir. 1979) (per curiam); East Girard Sav. Ass'n v. Citizens Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
593 F.2d 598, 600 (5th Cir. 1979).
170. Instituto Nacional de Comercializacion Agricola (Indeca) v. Continental Ill.
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 530 F. Supp. 279, 284 (N.D. I1l. 1982), cJ. Scarsdale Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 533 F. Supp. 378, 387-88 & n.16
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (presenting bank knew of facts that should have alerted it to make
further inquiry, and thus the bank "had the greatest opportunity to avoid the
situation"); Gillette, supra note 11, at 44 (transferee bank is uniquely situated to
discourage fraud).
171. See Instituto Nacional De Comercializacion Agricola (Indeca) v. Continental
Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 530 F. Supp. 279, 285 (N.D. Ill. 1982). An analogy can
also be made to the waiver and estoppel principles so frequently applied against the
issuing banks. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text. Application of equita-
ble waiver and estoppel is premised upon the beneficiary's justifiable reliance on the
issuer representations as the sole indication of documentary compliance. Barclays
Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 481 F.2d 1224, 1236 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
dismissed, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974); U.S. Indus. v. Second New Haven Bank, 462 F.
Supp. 662, 666 (D. Conn. 1978); East Bank v. Dovenmuehle, Inc., 196 Colo. 422,
429, 589 P.2d 1361, 1366 (1978). But see Northern Trust Co. v. Oxford Speaker Co.,
34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1246, 1251 (Ill. App. Ct. Sept. 22, 1982) (In
contrast to estoppel, application of waiver does not require reliance, but rather it
requires only an intentional relinquishment of a known right.). Similarly, because
the confirming bank is the only bank that actually deals with the beneficiary, the
customer is justified in relying upon that bank's representations. See supra note 170
and accompanying text.
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of the Code.17 2 In Indeca, the court isolated the duty owed to the
plaintiff by holding that the defendant bank "represented to all who
might foreseeably rely on such information that [the beneficiary] was
honest in its [representations]." 173 If it were later determined that the
bank had negligently made this representation it could be liable on
this basis. Unless the documents do not comply on their face, how-
ever, the Code clearly does not envision that a bank will incur liability
for merely being negligent; 174 if the documents do appear to comply,
the only duty owed is that of good faith.17 5
Applying a negligence standard destroys the concept of the indepen-
dence principle. 76 When the documents appear to comply, the bank
has no duty to go behind the documents, 7 7 for if it did both its costs
and the risk of wrongful honor would greatly increase. 78 Assuming
the bank is acting in good faith, it must honor the draft. In the
hypothetical, and arguably in Indeca, the bank was not negligent;
rather, it acted in bad faith. If the bank has been merely negligent,
under the principles espoused in the Code, liability should not be
imposed.
172. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (1977) ("Unless displaced by the particular provisions of
this Act, the principles of law and equity . . . shall supplement its provisions."
(emphasis added)), accord Girard Bank v. Mount Holly State Bank, 474 F. Supp.
1225, 1240 (D.N.J. 1979) (gap fillers should not be used when the Code directly
addresses a situation).
173. Instituto Nacional de Comercializacion Agricola (Indeca) v. Continental Ill.
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 530 F. Supp. 279, 284 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
174. See U.C.C. § 5-114 official comment 2 (1977) ("Documents, however, may
appear regular on their face and apparently conforming to the credit whereas in fact
they are forged or fraudulent [but] the issuer's duties to its customer are limited to
examination of the documents with care.").
175. See U.C.C. § 5-109 & official comment 1 (1977); H. Harfield I, supra note 2,
at 57.
176. See supra notes, 16-18 and accompanying text.
177. Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Bank of Va., 544 F. Supp. 386, 395 (D.
Md. 1982) ("[T]he obligation of the issuer of the letter of credit to pay such a draft is
determined solely by reference to the four corners of the letter of credit."); see
Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Heritage Bank, N.A., 595 F.2d 171, 176 (3d Cir. 1979)
(per curiam); Courtaulds N. Am., Inc. v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 528 F.2d 802,
805-06 (4th Cir. 1975); Data Gen. Corp. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 502 F. Supp. 776,
780 (D. Conn. 1980); United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp., 41
N.Y.2d 254, 259, 360 N.E.2d 943, 948, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265, 270 (1976); U.C.C. § 5-
109(2) & official comment 2 (1977); U.C.P., supra note 13, art. 8(a) & (c).
178. Verkuil, supra note 13, at 720 ("Naturally, the independence of the letter of
credit from the underlying mercantile agreement does much to limit the bank's risks
in entering into the transaction. Any additional obligation placed upon the bank will
reallocate the risks, raise the cost of the credit and necessarily restrict its utility."); see
Bank of Newport v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
650, 656 (8th Cir. Sept. 10, 1982); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Heritage Bank, N.A.,
595 F.2d 171, 176 (3d Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v.
Bank of Va., 544 F. Supp. 386, 396 (D. Md. 1982).
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While the concept of finding liability in tort is initially appealing, it
raises serious and disturbing implications. On the other hand, since
tort liability is imposed by law, it provides a basis for a duty by
replacing the need for privity.179 Accordingly, a hybrid could be
employed by incorporating the duty as defined by tort law and apply-
ing the principles of the Code to develop the specific duty that is
owed. Partial application of the tort of negligent misrepresentation
would fill this gap and could be implemented in such a way as to
supplement, rather than displace, the other provisions of the Code.
C. Warranty Liability Under Section 5-111(2)
Perhaps the best solution, although it has not yet been utilized by
any court, would be to hold the confirming bank liabile to the cus-
tomer for breach of warranty.18 0 Section 5-111(2)181 provides that
"[u]nless otherwise agreed a negotiating, advising, confirming, col-
lecting or issuing bank presenting or transferring a draft or demand
for payment. . . warrants only the matters warranted by a collecting
bank under Article 4 and any such bank transferring a document
warrants only the matters warranted by an intermediary under Arti-
cles 7 and 8."182 In essence, the warranties of Articles 4, 7 and 8 are
that of the bank's own good faith and authority. 18 3 Unfortunately,
section 5-111(2) is not clear as to whom the warranty runs. Two
interpretations of this section are possible. The warranty may run only
to the immediate transferee, in which case the confirming bank's
warranty of good faith would not inure to the benefit of the ultimate
customer. The second possibility is that the warranty runs with the
documents. Under this formulation, the customer would be the recipi-
ent of the confirming bank's warranty of good faith.
179. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
180. Section 5-111 contains two sets of warranties: § 5-111(1) defines the warran-
ties given by the beneficiary and § 5-111(2) defines the warranties given by the
banks. See U.C.C. § 5-111 (1977). The warranties of § 5-111(2) do not appear to
have been addressed in any reported decisions. The § 5-111(1) warranties have been
briefly mentioned in a few decisions. See Pubali Bank v. City Nat'l Bank, 676 F.2d
1326, 1329 n.5 (9th Cir. 1982); Bossier Bank & Trust Co. v. Union Planters Nat'l
Bank, 550 F.2d 1077, 1081 app. A (6th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (adopting memoran-
dum decision of lower court); Werner v. A.L. Grootemaat & Sons, 80 Wis. 2d 513,
524 n.22, 259 N.W.2d 310, 315 n.22 (1977).
181. U.C.C. § 5-111(2) (1977).
182. Id.
183. Id. § 5-111 official comment; see id. §§ 4-207, 7-508, 8-306. The first official
comment to § 3-417 states: "Warranty terms . . . are used with the intention of
bringing in all the usual rules of law applicable to warranties, and in particular the
necessity of reliance in good faith and the availability of all remedies for breach of
warranty." Id. § 3-417 official comment I (emphasis added).
1250 [Vol. 51
CONFIRMING BANK LIABILITY
One factor favoring the position that the warranty runs only to the
immediate transferee is that section 5-111(1),'8 4 which defines the
beneficiary's warranties, expressly states that the beneficiary makes
those warranties "to all interested parties."' 85 Section 5-111(2), defin-
ing all bank warranties, contains a much more limited warranty.'8 6
The absence of the phrase "to all interested parties" from this section is
a significant indication that such warranties do not run with the
documents.
On the other hand, there is textual support for the theory that the
warranties do run to the ultimate customer. By way of analogy, the
section 4-207' 87 warranties, which are referred to in section 5-
111(2), 18 do run with the documents.'8 9 Therefore, each collecting
bank remains liable to any other bank in the collection chain despite
the absence of privity.' 90 Moreover, the official comment to section 5-
111(2)'"' directs the reader to the official comment to section 5-
114(2).192 This comment provides that "[t]he risk of the original bad-
faith action of the beneficiary is thus thrown upon the customer who
selected him rather than upon innocent third parties or the issuer."'
93
This incorporation into Article 5 of the holder in due course doc-
trine'9 4 shields intermediary banks who purchase and transfer a draft
in good faith; by implication, the customer need not assume the risk of
184. Id. § 5-111(1).
185. Id. & official comment. The beneficiary's warranty clearly runs to the cus-
tomer for he is an interested party. Werner v. A.L. Grootemaat & Sons, 80 Wis. 2d.
513, 524 n. 2 2 , 259 N.W.2d 310, 315 n.22 (1977); see Pubali Bank v. City Nat'l Bank,
676 F.2d 1326, 1329-30 & n.5 (9th Cir. 1982). In Pubali, the court stated that the
customer had standing to sue the confirming bank on the basis of the § 5-111(1)
warranty because it had indemnified the issuing bank. Id. at 1329 n.5. Although
unclear, it appears that the court applied the beneficiary warranty to the advising
bank based on the theory that the bank had acted in its own interest in accepting an
assignment of the proceeds of the credit. Therefore, in light of said assignment, the
advising bank became, in essence, the beneficiary of the letter of credit. See id. at
1329 & n.5.
186. Compare U.C.C. § 5-111(1) (1977) (beneficiary warrants that "the necessary
conditions of the credit have been complied with") with id. § 5-111(2) and official
comment (banks warrant only their own good faith and authority).
187. U.C.C. § 4-207 (1977).
188. See U.C.C. § 5-111(2) (1977).
189. U.C.C. § 4-207 official comment 2 (1977); T. Quinn, supra note 125, 4-
207[A][2]-[3].
190. See supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text.
191. U.C.C. § 5-111(2) official comment (1977).
192. Id. § 5-114 official comment 2.
193. Id.
194. Section 3-302(1) provides: "A holder in due course is a holder who takes the
instrument (a) for value; and (b) in good faith; and (c) without notice that it is
overdue or has been dishonored or of any defense against or claim to it on the part of
any person." Id. 3-302(1).
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an intermediary bank acting in bad faith.195 Employing a Barclays
style analysis,19 6 the Code should not be interpreted in a fashion that
affords a bank acting in bad faith the same insulation from liability
afforded intermediary banks that display "honesty in fact." 197 Thus,
section 5-111(2) should be interpreted to run with the documents so as
to provide a needed remedy for the unique situation in which a
confirming bank facilitates a beneficiary's fraudulent conduct or per-
petrates a fraud of its own. 198
Both interpretations are plausible, but in light of the "gap" per-
ceived in the Code, 99 the position that the warranty runs with the
documents is clearly the more desirable view. The warranty theory,
though untested, provides the best solution to the problem posed in
the hypothetical at the beginning of this Note. 20 0 Because the war-
ranty can be interpreted as running with the documents, the need for
privity is eliminated. 20 1 Additionally, unlike the use of a gap filler by
analogy 20 2 or the imposition of tort liability, 20 3 the warranty of good
In letter of credit transactions the issuer must honor a draft presented by a holder
in due course even if it has been alerted to the existence of fraud in the transaction.
Id. § 5-114(2)(a); see Scarsdale Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank,
533 F. Supp. 378, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (when there is fraud in the transaction, the
burden shifts to the party seeking honor to establish holder in due course status):
United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 254, 259, 360
N.E.2d 943, 948, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265, 270 (1976) (customer may enjoin issuer from
honoring a draft presented by one who is not a holder in due course).
195. Cf. U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1977) (duty of good faith cannot be disclaimed); id. §
1-203 (every duty in the Code includes an obligation of good faith).
196. See Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 481 F.2d 1224, 1230
(5th Cir. 1973) (before adopting a particular interpretation of a Code provision, it
must be determined that the policy justifications for that provision will be advanced),
cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974). See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
197. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1977). "The effect of provisions of this Act may be
varied by agreement, except ... that the obligations of good faith, diligence, reason-
ableness and care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed .... ." Id. § 1-102(3).
Interpreting the § 5-111(2) warranty of good faith as running to the ultimate cus-
tomer would provide him with a remedy if this justifiable reliance proves to be
injurious.
198. The confirming bank, like the issuer, is a principal party in the transaction
with a duty to honor the conforming drafts. Kozolchyk I, supra note 4, at 235- see H.
Harfield I, supra note 2, at 33 (modification of credit not binding on confirmer
without his consent). The customer must be able to rely on the assumption that the
confirming bank is a neutral party acting in good faith. Cf. H. Harfield III, supra
note 6, at 104 (the issuer must maintain "a position of Jovian impartiality" due to
"equal but diametrically opposed" obligations to both the customer and tle benefi-
ciary).
199. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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faith is expressly included in the Code.20 4 Moreover, it is a narrower
remedy than those utilized by the courts. If a draft is honored when
the documents do not comply on their face, both the issuing bank and
the confirming bank will have breached a duty of care.20 5 In this
situation, resolution of the issue will most easily and satisfactorily be
obtained in a suit against the issuer. Imposition of a warranty limits
the confirming bank's exposure to suit by the ultimate customer to the
one situation in which it alone has breached the Code-imposed duty of
good faith.
CONCLUSION
Under the present interpretation of the Code, the confirming bank
is effectively shielded from liability and is therefore not encouraged to
act in good faith toward the ultimate customer. 20 6 The confirming
bank deals directly with the beneficiary and is in the best position to
recognize fraudulent conduct. 207 As the hypothetical illustrated, the
confirming bank may have additional business dealings with the bene-
ficiary, leading to a natural alliance between the two.208 Despite the
absence of privity, a number of legally supportable bases for imposing
liability exist. Extension of the Code provisions by analogy, imposition
of tort liability, or utilization of a warranty theory all present possible
means of filling the gap that presently exists. Extending the duty of
good faith owed by the confirming bank is clearly consistent with the
general scheme of the Code. 20 9 More importantly, interpreting that
duty as running to the ultimate customer will have the necessary
chilling effect on any inclination by the confirming bank to honor the
credit wrongfully.
Diane Furman Dann
204. See U.C.C. § 5-111(2) & official comment (1977).
205. See id. §§ 5-107(2), 5-109(2).
206. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 197.
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